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 Abstract 
Recent empirical studies claim to have identified roots of Africa’s poverty 
in its colonial past, particularly in the ‘extractive’ or ‘illegitimate’ institutions 
that the colonial powers bequeathed. While taking a similar quantitative 
approach this paper accepts the view of many historians that colonial 
institutions were just as much African in origin as they were exogenously 
imposed. The number of colonial administrators relative to the African 
population – or the ‘thin white line’ – in 33 African colonies is examined. This 
varied considerably across the continent but is largely explicable by factors 
which appear to have had little direct effect on economic performance. 
There is found to be a strong and robust positive correlation between the 
closeness of administration during the colonial period and economic growth 
since independence, particularly where pre-colonial political systems were 
relatively decentralised. It is proposed that this correlation is the result of a 
causal relationship: where colonial powers were unable or unwilling to rule 
over their subjects directly they inadvertently increased competition between 
Africans over productive resources and political power. This has aggravated 
the insecurity of the poorest and least connected within African societies and 
rendered the pursuit of wealth contingent on active participation in political 
processes. 
 
 
This paper investigates whether the experience of colonialism, and 
in particular indirect rule, has contributed to sub-Saharan Africa’s (on 
average) poor economic performance since independence, and if so, 
through which causal mechanisms. Much of the existing empirical 
literature on colonial legacies overestimates the capacity of the colonial 
state and overlooks the most important means by which the “thin white 
line” maintained “hegemony on a shoestring”:1 collaboration with 
indigenous elites.2 
                                                 
1 Phrases coined by Kirk-Greene and Berry respectively. 
2 An exception is Lange, ‘British colonial legacies’, but this study also has its limitation, 
to be discussed below. 
 
1
 In a hugely influential paper, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(AJR) provided evidence that colonial experience did matter.3 They show 
that, across 64 former colonies (23 of them African), pre-quinine 
European settler mortality is correlated with the present-day risk of 
expropriation and therefore income. If settler mortality has not had a 
direct effect on income this relationship, they argue, must stem from the 
policies and associated institutions of colonisation, which depended on 
the number of European settlers. According to AJR most of Africa is 
characterised by high settler mortality, low levels of European settlement 
and “extractive” colonial institutions which have persisted to the present.  
AJR’s story has limited explanatory power however, especially in 
the African context. Outside the ‘settler’ colonies, the European 
population was typically very small, yet economic performance within sub-
Saharan Africa has been far from homogenous.4 It has even been 
suggested that the ‘peasant’ colonies – where European settlement was 
negligible (or forbidden) – have inherited institutions more favourable to 
the reduction of poverty.5 To classify African colonial states as purely 
‘extractive’ is a gross simplification that obscures much variation over 
time and space, and the fact that it was “often in the interests of colonial 
rulers to facilitate African enterprise.”6 AJR overstate the ability of the 
European powers to impose their ‘chosen’ institutions at will, ignoring the 
“repeatedly demonstrated capacity [of Africans] to contribute crucially to 
shaping their own economic destinies.”7 If the colonial experience did 
                                                 
3 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘Colonial origins’. 
4 For example, in the 1930s, neighbouring Bechuanaland and Northern Rhodesia 
(Botswana and Zambia) both had seven Europeans for every 1,000 Africans 
(Kuczynski, Colonial Population). From Independence to the 1990s Botswana’s annual 
per capita growth was in excess of 5%, while Zambia’s per capita income declined 
significantly (Englebert, State Legitimacy, p.3). 
5 Bowden el al, ‘Measuring and Explaining Poverty’. 
6 Moreover, this was more likely to be the case in the ‘peasant’ colonies, see Austin, 
‘The reversal of fortune thesis’, pp.1007-1008, quote p.1020. 
7 Ibid., pp.1019-1020. A similar argument is made by Bayly in the context of India, 
‘Indigenous and Colonial Origins’. 
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 have long-term economic legacies in Africa, it is clear that “the causal 
relationships involved are more differentiated than AJR’s formulations 
recognise.”8 
Pierre Englebert argues that the key to explaining Africa’s post-
colonial economic performance is the ‘legitimacy’ of states – whether or 
not they are “congruent with informal institutions and norms”. 9 In a cross-
country quantitative investigation, he constructs a dummy variable for 
‘vertical legitimacy’, which supposedly captures “the embeddedness of 
the post-colonial state into pre-colonial relations of authority,”10 and an 
index of ‘horizontal legitimacy’ – the proportion of the population that 
belongs to an ethnic group that is split between two or more countries – 
which is intended to proxy “the extent to which there is agreement about 
what community the state rules over.”11 Englebert finds these variables to 
be significant determinants of ‘good governance’ and therefore economic 
growth. Englebert sees the line of causality running from “incongruence 
between pre- and post-colonial institutions” to greater “relative payoffs to 
domestic elites of adopting neo-patrimonial polices over developmental 
ones.”12 As others have put it, “having only limited legitimacy, 
governments were acutely exposed to pressures from their own narrow 
base of supporters” 13 while “the mass of rural producers… lack[ed] 
political organisations with which to defend their interests.”14 Englebert 
claims that state illegitimacy accounts for Africa’s poor economic 
performance on average – in his model the Africa dummy is insignificant15 
– and the heterogeneity of experiences within Africa; vertical legitimacy 
                                                 
8 Austin, ‘The reversal of fortune thesis’, p.996. 
9 Englebert, ‘Pre-colonial institutions’, p. 11. 
10 Ibid., p.16. The only mainland African states that Englebert judges to be legitimate in 
this sense are Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Rwanda and Burundi.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Englebert, ‘Pre-colonial institutions’, p.7. 
13 Collier and Gunning, ‘Explaining’, p.68. 
14 Bates, Markets and States, p.12. 
15 Englebert, ‘AFRICA Dummy’. 
 
3
 accounts for half of the variation across the continent, and horizontal 
legitimacy 20 percent.16 
While pointing to the arbitrariness of the boundaries drawn at the 
Berlin conference in creating low horizontal legitimacy, the main limitation 
of Englebert’s argument is that it does not adequately explain the origins 
of vertical illegitimacy.17 While it is true that present-day African states 
(except Ethiopia) have not developed in a wholly ‘natural’ or ‘endogenous’ 
manner, it is wrong to claim, as Englebert does, that colonial regimes 
were able to ‘import’ political institutions of their choosing, and not rely on 
the legitimacy of pre-existing authorities.18 If colonialism did affect the 
development path of African institutions, it did so in a complex manner – 
reinterpreting, perhaps reinforcing and perhaps distorting; there was no 
clean break from the past. 
The approach taken here emphasises the weakness of the colonial 
state and the central role of African agency. A key variable which affected 
the behaviour of both the ‘lone-handed DC’ (District Commissioner) and 
(perhaps more importantly) his potential African collaborators is the 
number of provincial administrators relative to the African population. This 
is estimated using the official staff lists and colonial population records. 
Regression analysis is used to examine the relationship between this 
variable and economic growth since independence. Of course, correlation 
does not necessarily imply causation; economic performance could be 
driven by underlying characteristics of African societies which also 
shaped the nature of colonialism. The factors that determined the 
thinness of the ‘white line’ are examined in an attempt to isolate any 
enduring legacies from its endogenous nature. A second identification 
                                                 
16 Englebert, State legitimacy, p. 9. 
17 Of course, ‘vertical legitimacy’ is a concept that is almost impossible to quantify. 
18 In an endnote, Englebert states (erroneously) that, “although colonialism used local 
systems to extend its rule, it did not base its rule upon them or their legitimacy”, State 
legitimacy, ch. 5, note 5, p.118. 
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 strategy exploits the central role of Africans in the making of their own 
history by examining how the ‘legacy’ of the white line varies with the 
nature of pre-existing institutions.19 
Section I examines the nature of indirect colonial rule in Africa and 
the potential economic legacies that have been identified in the literature. 
Section II considers the closeness of administration, its appropriateness 
as a measure of indirect rule and the significance of any variation across 
colonial powers and time. Section III investigates the determinants of the 
white line, section IV its effects. Section V considers the significance and 
some implications of the results. Section VI concludes. 
 
 
I 
I.1 What was Indirect Rule? 
One of the most striking characteristics of Europe’s imperial 
adventure in Africa was the tiny amount of resources devoted to it; this 
was “colonialism-on-the-cheap”.20 Even by the ‘high-noon of empire’ – the 
late 1930s – there were barely 3,000 European administrators ruling over 
an African population approaching 90 million.21 This ‘thin white line’ was 
forced to rule indirectly through pre-existing institutions such as 
chieftainship and customary law and land tenure, a necessity that was 
always present whether or not the ideology of indirect rule was explicit. As 
Fields has put it, “for a state born illegitimate and forced to scrimp all its 
                                                 
19 In particular the degree of political centralisation. Since it is generally accepted that 
indirect rule was easier to implement in politically centralised societies, if the 
relationship between the closeness of colonial administration and subsequent 
economic performance is causal, it would be expected that it will be strongest in the 
instance of low political centralisation. In econometric terms, the interaction term 
between the white line and pre-colonial political centralisation will be negative. 
20 Kilson, Political Change, p.24. 
21 This includes only British, French and Belgian colonies. See below for details and 
sources. 
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 life, chiefs’ legitimacy was the best available makeshift.”22 Where there 
was no pre-existing chief, the colonial creations that filled the void had to 
“strike a resonant chord in the community” to be effective.23 The following 
passage illustrates the pragmatic approach that colonial administrators 
were forced to take: 
 
Before the re-organisation of a people is attempted, administrative 
officers are required to trace its history and the nature of its 
indigenous institutions; to consider what may remain of these 
institutions and how they can be built upon so that an executive 
authority and a judicial system may be set up which the people will 
accept and obey now. The administration proposed must be in 
accordance with the wishes of the people themselves and officers 
are advised that if a system desired by the people is sound it 
should not be rejected merely because is not wholly in accordance 
with ancient institutions.24 
 
Under colonial rule customary institutions were therefore 
‘reinterpreted’, through a process in which Africans were active 
participants.25 Since the definition of ‘traditional’ was open to challenge, 
the “search for tradition” served as “a mechanism for generating factional 
struggle”.26 Moreover, “once colonial administrators acknowledged the 
sovereignty of traditional discourse, they too became subject to it.”27 In 
particular, attempts to introduce individual rights to buy and sell land were 
frustrated.28 Indirect rule was thus a result of – and reinforced – the 
weakness of colonial regimes in Africa. 
                                                 
22 Fields, Revival and Rebellion, p.64. 
23 Harries, ‘Imagery’, p.107. 
24 Sierra Leone, Report by J. S. Fenton on a visit to Nigeria, 1935. 
25 See Spear, ‘Neo-traditionalism’. 
26Dunn and Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity, p.73. The ‘search for tradition’ is 
a phrase coined by Berry, see No condition, pp.22-42. 
27 Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p.13. This is clearly illustrated by the cocoa hold-ups 
organised by Ghanaian chiefs in the 1930s, see Austin, ‘Capitalists and chiefs’. 
28 See Phillips, The enigma of colonialism. 
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 Broadly, the literature on indirect rule highlights two channels 
through which the system could have had long-term economic legacies. 
The first is by increasing ‘fractionalisation’, be it ethnic or otherwise. The 
second, associated particularly with the work of Sara Berry, stresses the 
effects indirect rule had on the access to resources, in particular 
reinforcing the competitive nature of property rights. 
 
I.2 Fractionalisation 
Bayart states that the present-day “precipitation of ethnic identities 
becomes incomprehensible if it is divorced from colonial rule.”29 Indirect 
rule certainly did make existing divisions less flexible. In most pre-colonial 
African societies, “status and wealth depended on accumulating 
dependents and followers”,30 outsiders who could increase the leader’s 
prestige or the community’s labour force were usually welcomed, and 
“communities were more often than not multiethnic.”31 Under indirect rule 
“the African was containerized, not as a native, but as a tribesperson… 
[because] customary law was defined in the plural, as the law of the tribe, 
not in the singular, as a law for all natives.”32 For example, in pre-colonial 
Kenya the division between the Kikuyu and Maasai was fluid: many 
Maasai left pastoralism “to take refuge with surrounding populations of 
cultivators and hunters.”33 But with the imposition of colonial rule, 
“imprecisely drawn boundaries hardened and became policed borders 
that divided rather than united communities on either side” and the 
“identities that had once been complementary now came to symbolise 
norms and values that could be perceived as being alien or opposed.”34 
                                                 
29 Bayart, The state in Africa, p.51. 
30 Berry, No Condition, p.33. 
31 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p.140. 
32 Ibid., p. 22. 
33 Waller, ‘Acceptees and Aliens’, p.227. 
34 Ibid., pp.226-7. 
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 Increasing the ‘social distance’ between individuals increases the 
transaction cost of any economic interaction. Leeson has argued that pre-
colonial institutions – which overcame social distance and enabled trade 
to occur by screening outsiders for low discount rates – were disrupted by 
the ‘noise’ introduced by colonial rule.35 Leeson focuses on stateless and 
quasi-stateless pre-colonial societies, where “agents adopted the 
customs and practices of the outsiders they wanted to trade with to signal 
their credibility”36 and “commercial interaction was an important element 
creating homogeneity.”37 But when these societies came under indirect 
colonial rule individuals were often forced to follow the customs and 
practices which had been ascribed to their ‘tribe’, such signals were 
rendered meaningless and widespread trade and co-operation stifled.38 
The negative impact of ‘fractionalisation’ on economic policy and 
political stability is generally accepted, as fragmented societies “will be 
both prone to competitive rent-seeking by the different groups and have 
difficulty agreeing on public goods.”39 Mamdani has argued that because 
of the tribal nature of customary law, “revolt against indirect rule also took 
a tribal form”, and that tribalism then “contaminated” post-colonial 
politics.40 
But just as ethnic diversity does not necessarily equate to 
fractionalisation, societies can be fragmented along non-ethnic lines. An 
advantage of indirect rule for the colonial power was that it served to 
‘internalise’ opposition to the regime. As one official reported in Ghana in 
                                                 
35 Leeson, ‘Endogenizing fractionalization’. 
36 Ibid., p.82. 
37 Thornton, Africa and Africans, p.194. 
38 A weakness of this line of argument is that it probably overstates the inflexibility of 
indirect rule in practice. For example, the British often did not codify customary law with 
the explicit purpose of maintaining a degree of flexibility, Shadle, ‘Changing traditions’, 
while Berry has documented how the “structures and the boundaries of native 
administrations were periodically readjusted”, with the result of “maintaining fluid, 
flexible social boundaries and structures of authority”, No Condition, pp.35-7. 
39 Easterly and Levine, ‘Africa’s growth tragedy’, p.1205. 
40 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p.183. 
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 1930, “what disturbances occur are invariably in the nature of ‘faction 
fights’.”41 Political scientists have argued that indirect rule left post-
colonial African states in a precarious position as the central 
administrations they inherited were weak relative to local level authorities, 
hence they chose to consolidate their power through state patronage and 
clientelism.42 Clapham has argued that in Sierra Leone paramount 
chiefdoms “came to form the local building blocks from which rival 
clientelist networks were constructed.”43 
Lange has attempted to test this hypothesis statistically. In a 
sample of 33 former British colonies with low levels of European 
settlement (14 of them in mainland Africa), he finds that his proxy for the 
extent of indirect rule (the percentage of court cases in 1955 that were 
conducted in colonially recognised customary courts) is strongly and 
negatively correlated with a number of indicators of political development, 
especially political stability and the rule of law.44 The main limitation of the 
study is that it cannot be assumed that the correlation is the result of a 
causal relationship. The only controls Lange includes are the size of the 
European population, the population density at the beginning of the 
colonial period, ethnic diversity, as measured by Easterly and Levine, and 
dummies for Africa and plantation economies. If the extent of indirect rule 
is correlated with any other characteristic of the former colonies which 
could have also affected political development directly, the estimated 
effect of indirect rule will be biased. There is also reason to suppose that 
                                                 
41 Quoted in Dunn and Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity, p.87. Such struggles 
tended to be within, rather than between, chieftaincies. 
42 For example, see Boone, ‘Sates and ruling classes’. Also note the similarities with 
Englebert’s argument, although he overlooks the significance of indirect rule. 
43 Clapham, ‘The politics of failure’, p.77. 
44 Lange, ‘British colonial legacies’. 
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 indirect rule in Africa was in some ways unique, and has had a potentially 
more significant economic legacy.45 
 
I.3 Land Tenure 
In the context of India, Banerjee and Iyer find that colonial land 
policies have had a persistent impact on economic performance. In 
particular, areas where the British collected land revenue through large 
landlords are now characterised by relatively low agricultural investment 
and productivity.46 It is therefore reasonable to suppose that colonialism 
in Africa may have had an analogous economic legacy. 
Perhaps the defining characteristic of land tenure in Africa today is 
its ‘social embeddedness’: its “entanglement” in “social, cultural, and 
political-economic matrices.”47 “The process of acquiring and defending 
rights in land is inherently a political process based on power relations 
among members of the social group.... A person’s status ... can and often 
does determine his or her capacity to engage in tenure building.”48 As a 
result, most scholars would agree, “African systems of landholding are 
characterised by pervasive negotiability, ambiguity and indeterminacy”,49 
and there is a “proliferation of debate, litigation and outright conflict over 
competing claims to land”.50 For example, in present-day Ghana “land … 
is a focus of intense and unequal competition.”51 Even in relatively 
sparsely populated Tanzania, “all social groups… participate in land 
negotiation processes, and their access to prosperity is determined by 
                                                 
45 Lange’s Africa dummy is consistently negative although not statistically significant. 
This could be due to Lange’s focus on political rather than economic development, or 
simply the small sample size. 
46 The authors use an instrumental variable approach to rule out the endogeneity of 
historical institutions, Banerjee and Iyer, ‘History’. 
47 Peters, ‘The limits of negotiability’, p.48. 
48 Basset and Crummey, Land in African agrarian systems, p.20. 
49 Peters, ‘The limits of negotiability’, p.46. 
50 Berry, ‘Every-day politics’, p.107. 
51 Ibid., p.124. 
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 active participation in these processes.”52 Since disputes over land often 
“turn on questions of historical precedent”,53 Africa’s colonial past must 
have had an impact on this ongoing social process. 
Berry argues that indirect rule reinforced the role of social networks 
and relationships in determining access to all resources, especially 
land.54 The result, contrary to the aims of the colonising powers, was to 
weave instability – “in the form of changing relations of authority and 
conflicting interpretations of rules – into the fabric of colonial rule.”55 
Challenges to customary land tenure were common, resulting from both
the indistinct and dynamic nature of African custom and from competit
between Africans for control of productive resources and political pow
One colonial official in Ghana lamented that “knowledge of ancient 
tradition is, in fact, small, but the manufacture of new ones has been 
raised … to the status of a rural industry.”
 
ion 
er. 
e 
-
he 
f 
                                                
56 The situation was therefor
worse where ‘custom’ was difficult to define, as was the case in politically
fragmented societies, or where the value of land was increasing due to 
the ‘cash crop revolution’ which often accompanied colonial rule.57 T
immediate repercussion was that courts were turned into mere “arenas o
struggle over control of land, revenue, jobs, and influence”.58 This 
competition has remained – perhaps even increased – in the post-colonial 
period as “both the implementation and the effects of land-reform policies 
 
52 Odgaard, ‘Scrambling for land’, p.71. 
53 Berry, ‘Every-day politics’, p.125. 
54 This argument is applied convincingly to three diverse regions (although all formerly 
British and with relatively high rainfall): the cocoa-based ‘peasant economies’ of 
southern Ghana and southwest Nigeria, the Kikuyu area of ‘settler’ Kenya and the ‘rural 
labour reserve’ of north-eastern Zambia. Berry, No Condition. 
55 Ibid., p.32. 
56 Quoted in Sutton, ‘Law, chieftaincy and conflict’, pp.42-3. 
57 Cocoa, which spread over much of coastal West Africa from the 1890s, is the most 
extreme case. 
58 Berry, No Condition, pp.36-9. 
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 [have borne] a striking resemblance to those of indirect rule.”59 Indirect 
rule served to ‘institutionalise’ conflict over resources. 
                                                
One colonial administrator dismissed land litigation as “a form of 
amusement which costs money.”60 But property rights becoming subject 
to “perpetual contest” could be hugely significant in economic terms. 61 
Although most litigation was between chiefs, they were “bound by custom 
and public opinion to fight any land case to the limit of his stool’s credit”.62 
The huge cost of litigation was thus ultimately borne by the farmers 
themselves. More generally, farmers had to “invest part of any available 
surplus in the means of contesting access to resources [ie. cultivating 
social status in order to challenge customary authority], leaving less for 
investing in directly productive capital.”63 One important method of 
increasing social status and respect within the community (and therefore 
the ability to exercise claims to land) is by making contributions to (or at 
least attending) ceremonies such as marriages, funerals, naming 
ceremonies and initiation rites.64 This sort of expenditure (and therefore 
foregone investment) was – and is – far from insignificant: a survey of 187 
cocoa-farming families in Nigeria in 1951-2 found that on average four 
percent of income was devoted to social and ceremonial expenses.65 
Berry argues that the uncertainty inherent in this competitive 
method of accessing resources has encouraged farmers to diversify their 
 
59 Ibid., p.132. 
60 G.G. Shute, Chief Commissioner of Eastern Provinces, Nigeria. The comment was 
made as an explanation for the fall in litigation during the depression. Annual report on 
the Southern Provinces of Nigeria, 1938, p.5. 
61 Berry, No Condition, p.40. 
62 A DC in Ghana in 1940, quoted in Austin, ‘Capitalists and chiefs’, pp.87-8. 
63 Berry, No Condition p.42. 
64 Ibid., p.160. 
65 Galletti et al., Nigerian cocoa farmers. Cocoa prices were high at the time. This 
phenomenon could help account for the observed propensity of some of the world’s 
poorest households, including those in Africa, to spend a surprisingly large proportion 
of their income on festivals, see Banerjee and Duflo, ‘Economic Lives’. Time spent 
attending such ceremonies, which reduces possible labour inputs, should also be 
considered. 
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 income streams, further inhibiting the development of commercial 
agriculture in post-colonial Africa.66 Although more nuanced, this echoes 
arguments traditionally put forward by economists regarding tenure 
insecurity (and hence weak incentives for investment) resulting from 
poorly defined property rights.67 Partly in recognition of Berry’s work, 
economists are now beginning to pay attention to the social context of 
African systems of land tenure. In a microeconometric study of Akwapim, 
Ghana, Goldstein and Udry explicitly test Berry’s hypothesis. They find 
that “individuals who are not central to the networks of social and political 
power that permeate these villages are much more likely to have their 
land expropriated while it is fallow.”68 Their fallow periods are therefore 
shorter than would be technically optimal, reducing the productivity of 
their land.69 
Although Berry is sceptical, others have argued that ‘unequal 
competition’ for land is leading to the concentration of land ownership and 
class formation. Peters argues that many areas have seen the 
“accumulation of land by a political and civil elite”.70 Significantly, “the 
accumulators are not ‘kulaks’… but bureaucratic and professional ‘big 
men’”, who have “privileged access to information, credit, and 
administrative arenas”.71 Land concentration gives rise to varied land-
labour endowments and hence “an inefficient dispersion of marginal 
products unless offset by market mechanisms”.72 The final channel 
through which competition over land could be harming aggregate 
economic performance is by undermining sale and rental markets in 
                                                 
66 Berry, No condition, p.18. 
67 For example, see Feder and Noronha, ‘Land rights systems’. 
68 Udry and Goldstein, ‘The profits of power’, p.25. 
69 This is particularly relevant given that, in the context of expensive fertiliser and 
relative abundance of land, leaving land fallow is the most efficient way to increase 
yields. 
70 Peters, ‘Limits of negotiability’, p.57. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Collier and Gunning, ‘Explaining’, p.80. 
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 land.73 Even where tenure is secure (as is often the case with tree crops), 
the basis of this security is usage; “most land in Africa is still not readily 
marketable”.74 
 
 
II 
Given these potential casual mechanisms, the degree to which 
colonial administrations made use of – or attempted to ‘create’ – 
indigenous institutions could help explain the variation in economic 
performance across sub-Saharan Africa in the post-colonial period. But 
measuring the extent of indirect rule (and, still more, isolating any causal 
effect) is not a straightforward task. 
Lange’s measure of legal penetration (for 14 former British colonies 
in mainland Africa) is intended to proxy the overall extent to which 
colonial rule relied upon traditional institutions. The degree to which this 
measure varies – from under 40 percent in Gambia and Zimbabwe to 
over 90 percent in Nigeria – suggests that different colonies did indeed 
rely on traditional institutions to different extents. But a drawback of this 
measure is that it makes no distinction between those court cases 
presided over by ‘legitimate’ chiefs and those headed by ‘creations’ of the 
colonial regime.75 The extent of de facto indirect rule – and its effects – 
must have depended on the ‘suitability’ of pre-existing institutions. 
“Officials ruled indirectly… whether or not the available institutions were 
                                                 
73 Such competition, by inhibiting the use of land as collateral, could have also 
undermined credit markets. 
74 Collier and Gunning, ‘Explaining’, p.80. But it should be noted that land transactions 
are becoming more common. See André and Platteau, ‘Land relations’, for an example 
of widespread (and technically illegal) land sales, in Rwanda before the genocide. 
There is even evidence of some land sales (although conducted by chiefs on behalf of 
their subjects) in the early colonial period, see Hill, Migrant cocoa-farmers. 
75 The correlation between Lange’s measure of indirect rule and the extent of pre-
colonial state development (as measure by Rainer and Gennaioli) is -0.40. Counter-
intuitively suggesting that there was more collaboration where the available institutions 
were the least appropriate. 
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 readily adaptable to this use”, but “indirect rule worked best in such tightly 
organized political systems” as in Northern Nigeria and Buganda.76 
It has been said that the power of the “thin white line” rested upon 
“coercion, collaborators, confidence, and competence.” 77 Kirk-Greene 
places the greatest emphasis on the last two, and even states that “the 
DC was the government and the government was the DC.” 78 But others 
(correctly) dismiss this notion; it was not the white administrator but 
“indigenous collaborators, [that] more than anything else, determined the 
organisation and character of colonial rule”.79 Under indirect rule “the 
colonial state [was] a consumer of power generated within the customary 
order.”80 As Cameron, Governor of Tanganyika, acknowledged, “the 
natives’ loyalties to their own institutions … form one of the most valuable 
possessions which we have inherited ...[and] make for law and order in 
the land as nothing else can.”81 
Traditionally some scholars have classified only British colonial rule 
as indirect, whereas the French and others were ‘assimilist’ or somehow 
ruled more directly. The explicit theory of indirect rule – as defined by 
Lugard, the first Governor of Northern Nigeria – was confined to British 
colonies. And almost all of the literature which deals explicitly with the 
legacies of indirect rule has focused on former British colonies.82 
But the “assorted rois de la brousse paid little heed to procedure 
and administered their areas of responsibility with a large degree of 
discretion”,83 and the practical realities facing the British District Officer, 
                                                 
76 Fields, Revival and Rebellion, p.33 and p.32. 
77 Kirk-Greene, ‘The thin white line’, p.38. 
78 Kirk-Greene, Imperial administrators, p.186. 
79 Robinson, ‘Non-European foundations’, p.139. According to Fields, an “occupational 
requirement” for a DC, more important than confidence or competence, was an 
“inattention to reality”, Revival and Rebellion, p.50 
80 Fields, Revival and Rebellion, p.31. 
81 Comment made in 1937, quoted in Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p.9. 
82 For example, Lange’s sample consists only of former British colonies, while Berry’s 
case studies are Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Zambia. 
83 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, p.12. 
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 the French Commandant de Cercle or the Belgian Administrateur 
territoriaux were – to a great extent – the same. The reason the French 
tolerated slavery, and even slave trading, following their conquest in West 
Africa was precisely that they depended on the acquiescence of African 
elites.84 In 1902, Lyautey remarked that there was a need “so far as 
possible to keep intact the indigenous governmental machinery, 
institutions, serviceable customs, and traditional chiefs, leaving to them 
the direct exercise of police, administration, even justice and tax 
collection”.85 Robert Delavignette acknowledged that in French West 
Africa “colonial institutions [were] determined by the evolution of the 
natives in a new African world, rather than by the theoretical conceptions 
of the home country.”86 In other words, “officials ruled indirectly, whether 
or not they recognized the fact”.87 Fields argues that the formal 
introduction of indirect rule in Zambia (in 1929) and Malawi (1933) did not 
affect the situation on the ground. In fact, the extent of collaboration was 
greater in the earlier period when white administrators were even fewer.88 
This illustrates the importance of the size of the ‘white line’: the 
number of European administrators relative to the African population – a 
variable that was far from constant across the continent. In the following 
analysis it will be assumed the lower this ratio the greater the extent of 
collaboration necessary. Figure 1 shows this assumption appears valid 
when considering Lange’s measure for the extent of indirect rule. Of 
course there are factors which could have affected the extent of 
                                                 
84 Klein, Slavery and colonial rule. 
85 Quoted in Hailey, African survey, p.206, translated into English by Fields, Revival 
and Rebellion, p.62. 
86 Delavignette, Freedom and authority, p.51. 
87 Fields, Revival and Rebellion, p33. That said, it is possible that French 
administrators were more inclined to use coercion instead of collaboration, relative to 
their British counterparts. Cohen suggests that the upper-class background of the 
average DO made him more likely to accommodate indigenous elites relative to the 
French (most likely Republican) commandant, Rulers of Empire, pp.73-4. 
88 Fields, Revival and Rebellion, pp.32-6. 
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 collaboration for any given number of administrators,89 further 
consideration of such factors will be deferred until section V. 
 
Figure 1. The 'White Line' Versus Lange's Extent of Indirect Rule 
 
Source: Lange, ‘British colonial legacies’. For the number of administrators see text 
(below) and app. II. For country codes see app. III. 
 
 
II.1 The Thin White Line 
Of most interest is the provincial and district administrations – the 
white line running through the African countryside – rather than the entire 
colonial service in each territory, which included the central administration 
and technical departments predominantly based in the new colonial 
                                                 
89 These could include the identity of the coloniser, the extent of coercion,  the 
population density, the number of Africans ‘directly’ employed, the number of European 
settlers and the overall ‘strategy’ of colonisation. These factors could help explain the 
outliers observed in fig. 1. For example, the presence of European settlers in 
Zimbabwe could have made indirect rule less politically desirable, while the small size 
of the Gambia could have made ‘direct’ rule more feasible. 
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 towns.90 Care must be taken when comparing across different colonial 
powers that the comparison is like-for-like. In the British colonies, 
residents (or provincial commissioners), district officers (or district 
commissioners), assistant district officers and cadets are considered. This 
translates fairly well for the French colonies into administrateurs en chef, 
administrateurs (divided into three classes), administrateurs adjoints (also 
three classes), and élèves administrateurs. The Belgian administrative 
system was slightly different. The service territorial consisted of both 
fonctionnaires (officials) and agents.91 In a 1970 article, Crowder, citing 
Malcolm Hailey, states that there were 316 administrators in the Belgian 
Congo in 1936.92 This figure, and the corresponding ratio of 35,000 
Africans per administrator, has since been cited by many other 
scholars.93 But this excludes 412 agents, all of whom were European, 
and many had a university degree.94 Moreover, Hailey states that “so 
long as the Congo authorities can rely on this efficient and inexpensive 
European service there will be some hesitation in entrusting powers … to 
the chiefs.”95 For current purposes, it is therefore clear that the agents 
should be included. All colonial administrations employed Africans 
usually as clerks, translators or messengers. But there are no instances, 
at least before the Second World War, of Africans being used in the 
– 
                                                
administration proper.96 
 
90 Fields, Revival and Rebellion, p.33. As well as the provincial and central 
administrations, Europeans were usually employed in departments for medicine, 
education, justice, printing, agriculture, forestry, mining, public works, railways, ports 
and postal services as well as the police and military. 
91 The fonctionnaires consisted of provincial commissioners, district commissioners and 
administrators. 
92 M. Crowder, ‘The white chiefs’, p.329. 
93 Notably Kirk-Greene, ‘The thin white line’, p.38. 
94 The agents were primarily responsible for censuses and various public works. Hailey, 
African survey, pp.242-4. 
95 Ibid., p.244. 
96 Félix Éboué was a black governor of French Equatorial Africa during the Second 
World War, but was Guianese not African. 
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 Portuguese (Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau), Spanish 
(Equatorial Guinea) and Italian (Eritrea) colonies are not considered. Th
is due to the different objectives of these colonial powers and the related
differences in administrative structures.
is 
 
ept 
e 
 
pendent from South Africa until 1990 many of the 
f 
colonies are taken from Hailey’s An African survey, published in 1938.101 
                                                
97 Also excluded is Somalia, as 
different parts of the present-day country were colonised by Britain and 
Italy.98 Djibouti is excluded due to its tiny size, as are all islands exc
Madagascar (Mauritius, the Seychelles, São Tomé and Príncipe, Cap
Verde, Comoros and Réunion). Of course, countries not colonised 
(Ethiopia and Liberia) are not included, neither is South Africa (a self-
governing dominion from 1910). Data was collected for Namibia but since
the country was not inde
‘outcomes’ and control variables are unavailable, it is therefore excluded 
from most regressions. 
 This still leaves a sample of 33 former colonies,99 covering most o
the land area of sub-Saharan Africa (see Map 1). In the 1930s these 
territories accounted for around 90 percent of the sub-Saharan African 
population which was under European control.100 Table 1 and Map 1 
present data on the ratio of European administrators (as defined above) 
to the native population in the late 1930s. Most of the data for British 
 
97 For a discussion of Portuguese objectives in Africa see Clarence-Smith, ‘The myth of 
uneconomic imperialism’. The Portuguese often relied on Mestiços to administer their 
African possessions, and the “chefe de posto… was often charged with having gone 
native altogether”, Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, p.12. 
98 The same argument is not applied to Sudan – technically an Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium – as it was de facto a British colony.  Different parts of present-day 
Cameroon were formerly under French and British mandates, although the majority of 
the country was under French rule. 
99 Including Nambia. 
100 Kuczyhski, Colonial Population. 
101 Hailey, African survey, p.226. Hailey gives data for Nigeria (including British 
Cameroons), Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, 
Northern Rhodesia, Basutoland, Swaziland, Nyasaland and Bechuanaland. No dates 
are given, although his figures appear consistent with the staff lists in the relevant blue 
books for 1937. Hailey’s table is cited more or less completely in Kirk-Greene, ‘The thin 
white line’, tab. XIV, p.39. 
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ench 
ithin these two federations, which are now 12 independent countries.104 
 
                                                
Hailey also gives the number of administrators in the Belgian Congo an
Ruanda-Urundi.102 The data for the remaining British colonies (Suda
Zimbabwe and Namibia) was collected from the respective colonial 
government publications.103 The French ministry of colonies annual for 
1936 was used to obtain the number of administrators serving in Fr
West Africa (FWA), French Equatorial Africa (FEA), Togo, French 
Cameroon and Madagascar. Publications of the governments of FWA 
and FEA were then used to estimate the distribution of administrators 
w
 
102 Hailey, African survey, p.242. This time Hailey does give a date: 1936. 
103 Quarterly list of the Sudan government, Southern Rhodesia official year book and 
South West Africa, Estimates. 
104 See app. II for details. Senegal, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger 
and Burkina Faso were formerly territories in FWA. FEA comprised what are now 
Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic and Chad. 
Table 1. The White Line, circa 1937.  
Colony Number of Africans per administrator 
French Congo 5,843 
Swaziland 9,552 
Gabon 10,646 
Northern Rhodesia / Zambia 12,551 
Botswana / Bechuanaland 13,193 
Senegal 14,842 
Dahomey / Benin 15,057 
Belgian Congo / DRC 15,084 
Basutoland / Lesotho 17,531 
Gambia 17,963 
Kenya 18,697 
Mauritania 19,260 
Côte d'Ivoire 22,089 
Madagascar 23,451 
Guinea 23,525 
French Sudan / Mali 23,938 
Tanzania a 25,062 
Southern Rhodesia / Zimbabwe 26,246 
Chad 26,584 
Cameroon b 26,705 
Oubangui-Chari / Central African Republic 28,413 
Nyasaland / Malawi 31,401 
Togo 36,333 
Gold Coast / Ghana 39,219 
South West Africa / Namibia 41,058 
Uganda 44,086 
Sierra Leone 47,232 
Nigeria 56,428 
Sudan 60,643 
Burundi 65,713 
Rwanda 67,108 
Upper Volta / Burkina Faso 83,070 
Niger 203,076 
All British 37,374 
All French 25,209 
All Belgium 18,444 
West Africa 38,257 
East Africa 32,644 
Equatorial Africa 16,252 
Southern Africa 19,503 
All 27,940 
a Includes Tanganyika and Zanzibar. 
b Includes French and British Cameroon. 
Sources: See text. The data for French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa are 
estimates, see app. II for details. See app. III for actual number of administrators and 
population that these figures are based on, and the regional classification of each 
colony. All averages are weighted by population.
 
 
Map 1. 
 
 
A potential problem with the data is the difference between the 
number of Europeans employed and the “effective strength of the 
administration on the ground.”105 This could have varied across colonies 
as leave allowances and illness rates were not constant. In addition, “in 
                                                 
105 Kirk-Greene, ‘The thin white line’, p.33. 
 
 
 some cases – but not all – administrative officers seconded to the 
Ministries were still carried on the strength of the provincial 
administration.”106 There is also the concern – especially in large colonies 
such as Nigeria or the Belgian Congo – that the distribution of 
administrators was not even across different regions.107 Another problem 
arises from any inaccuracies introduced by the researcher who is forced 
to count individual names on the staff lists one by one.108 
Population statistics were taken from Kuscynski, Colonial 
population, and FWA and FEA official publications.109 It should be borne 
in mind that these statistics are far from perfect. Indeed, Frankel goes as 
far to say: “any calculations utilizing them must be regarded largely as 
informed guesses”.110 
Despite these margins for error, it is clear that there was a huge 
variation in the closeness of administration across the continent. On 
average, there appears to be some evidence that British colonies were 
more ‘indirect’. But this obscures variation within the same colonial power, 
which was especially high within French colonies; the white line in Niger 
was over 30 times ‘thinner’ than in the French Congo. Belgium rule on 
average was the most ‘direct’. But the large disparity between the Congo 
and Ruanda-Urundi suggests that local conditions, rather than anything 
inherent to Belgian rule were responsible. Sudan – rather than those 
                                                 
106 Ibid. 
107 In the Congo there was an official objective of one agent per 10,000 taxpayers, 
Hailey, African survey, p.244. It is not clear however whether reality reflected this policy, 
some areas (such as Katanga) may well have been more closely administered than 
others. The case of Nigeria will be considered below. 
108 For instance, Kirk-Greene (in ‘The thin white line’, Table VII, p.34) cites a figure of 
331 administrators in Nigeria in 1920. This author’s count of the relevant list (in the 
1920 Nigerian Blue book) came to 265. The latter figure seems more plausible given 
the corresponding figure was 239 in 1919 and 288 in 1921, Blue book for 1919, 
Handbook for 1921. 
109 See app. I for details. 
110 Frankel, Capital investment, p.169. Even by the mid-1930s, no formal censuses had 
been conducted in the Belgian Congo, Ruanda-Urundi, Sudan or French Togoland, 
and those that had been conducted elsewhere varied considerably in quality, 
Kuczynski, Colonial populations, pp.i-xiv and p.5. 
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 colonies most closely associated with indirect rule such as Nigeria or 
Uganda – is the British colony least closely administered. Table 1 
suggests that the ‘type’ of colony could have affected the closeness of 
administration. In particular, ‘concession’ or ‘plantation’ colonies 
(predominantly in Equatorial Africa) and ‘settler’ or ‘labour-reserve’ 
colonies (Kenya and much of Southern Africa) appear to have been 
administered more closely than the ‘peasant’ colonies of West Africa. This 
is consistent with the view that a colonial policy which involved the 
expropriation of land or an objective to force Africans into the labour 
market (to work for European settlers or concession companies) placed a 
greater strain on indigenous society and therefore required more 
administrators.111 However, the large variations within West Africa (Cf. 
Senegal, Dahomey and Gambia versus Niger, Upper Volta and Nigeria) 
suggest other factors were also at play.112 
Figure 2 shows that there is a correlation between the closeness of 
colonial administration and economic performance since independence. 
This relationship cannot yet be viewed as causal but it is at least 
consistent with the argument that indirect colonial rule has had a long-
term and negative economic legacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
111 For a discussion of this in the context of British West Africa, see Phillips, The 
enigma of colonialism. 
112 For example the size, revenue-generating capacity and political payoff to public 
investment could have been important. 
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 Figure 2. Colonial Administration and Post-Colonial Economic Performance 
 
Note: if independence came later than 1960, average growth is from the date of 
independence. Source: Englebert, ‘Pre-colonial institutions’. 
 
 
II.2 Change Over Time 
Table 2 shows how the size of the administrative service in a selection of 
British colonies changed from 1920 to 1950. Figure 3 supplements this 
with more detailed information for Nigeria during the interwar period. The 
first observation is that there was a clear upward trend in the number of 
administrators, especially during the 1920s. In just five years from 1925 to 
1930 the number of administrators in these eight colonies increased by 
25 percent. This must have exceeded the population growth rate, as 
suggested by Figure 3.113 Taking the population statistics at face value, 
the number of Africans per administrator in Nigeria fell from 63,000 in 
                                                 
113 Although, given that statistics for the level of population are unreliable, the inferred 
growth rate is even more so. 
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1912 to 44,000 in 1929.114 This trend was reflected in French and Belgian 
colonies. From 1921 to 1936 the number of administrators in FWA 
increased from 386 to 483, while in FEA from 1913 to 1936 the size of the 
administration doubled from 107 to 213. 115  From 1913 to 1936 the 
number of officials (excluding agents) in the Belgian Congo increased 
from 113 to 316.116 Over the following five years the total size of the 
Belgian administrative service (officials and agents in the Congo and 
Ruanda-Urundi) increased almost 20 percent from 777 to 921.117 Figure 3 
shows that in Nigeria the upward trend in the number of administrators 
was mirrored by an opposite trend in the number of European military 
personnel, suggesting the shift from military to civilian rule was still an 
ongoing process.118 
 
114 This growth is more dramatic given that it only began in the 1920s, after a decline in 
the number of administrators during the War. This suggests that the priorities of the 
colonial power also mattered. 
115 See app. II for sources. 
116 The figure for 1913 is taken from Gann and Duignan, Belgian Africa, tab. 18, p. 167. 
The figure for 1936 is from Hailey, African survey. Not too much should be read into 
this as the number of agents in 1913 in unclear – their numbers may have grown at a 
slower rate. 
117 The 1941 figure is taken from the Belgian Ministère des colonies, Annuaire, and the 
1936 figure is from Hailey, African survey, p.244. 
118 Up until the 1920s there were more Europeans employed in the army than in the 
provincial administration. Many administrators were also ex-military. 
 
 
Figure 3. Exports, Revenue and the Size of the Colonial Service in 
Nigeria, 1912-40 
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For original data and sources see app. IV. Note that revenue and value of exports have 
been converted into 1913 pounds, and that all six series have been scaled so that their 
earliest values are equal to 100. 
 
A second feature which is evident from both Table 2 and Figure 3 is 
that during the early 1930s there was a temporary break in this upward 
trend. From 1930 to 1935 the total number of administrators in the eight 
British colonies listed in Table 2 actually declined, by around five 
percent.119 The reason for this is obvious given that all colonies were 
expected to be self-financing. As one former administrator in Nigeria 
reflected, “revenue between the wars was never ample. In the worst 
years of the economic depression there was even the gruesome 
spectacle of the skeleton administration tightening its belt.”120 Figure 3 
shows that in the early 1930s the value of exports (the most important 
revenue source) fell below its pre-War level in real terms. And after 
                                                 
119 The fall was particularly great in Nigeria and Kenya, at around 15%. Northern 
Rhodesia is a notable exception, although a significant decline did occur in the 
following five year period. 
120 Nicolson, The Administration of Nigeria, p.217. 
 
 
 exports and revenue began to recover from the mid-30s, so too did the 
number of administrators.121 
That the number of administrators in all the colonies followed a 
similar trend means that the distribution of administrators across colonies 
remained roughly constant over time (see Table 2), and that not too much 
will be lost by taking a comparison at just one point in time. The late 
1930s – when the move to civilian rule was more or less complete – 
seems an appropriate point to take.122 The post-War period is not 
considered since the nature of colonialism had in many ways changed 
due to the international environment and pressures for more 
‘developmental’ policies. As Table 2 shows, the number of administrators 
had increased dramatically by 1950. The first African administrators were 
also beginning to appear.123 The data presented in Table 1 will therefore 
be used to construct a variable measuring the ‘thinness’ of the white line, 
and used in the following regression analysis. 
 
 
III 
III.1 Determinants of the White Line 
As Table 1 demonstrates, the ratio of white administrators to the 
African population varied greatly across colonies. This variation was 
certainly not random.124 This section identifies the principal factors which 
influenced the number of administrators in any given colony. 
                                                 
121 It is also worth noting that the trend in the number of administrators was mirrored by 
the trend in the size of the whole colonial service, suggesting that a DO was not viewed 
as more important or less dispensable than any other European employee. 
122 Another advantage is that population statistics at this time, although by no means 
perfect, were at least more reliable than before. A concern however, is that the 
depression could have affected different colonies to varying extents. 
123 Kirk-Greene, ‘The thin white line’, p.33. 
124 In an OLS regression with economic growth since independence as the dependent 
variable, the estimated coefficient of the ‘white line’ will therefore not be a valid 
measure of its effect on growth. Economic growth in the post-colonial period could be 
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 The previous section revealed some factors that could be important. 
Given that colonies were expected to be self-financing, one would expect 
greater revenue-generating capacity to be associated with closer 
administration. Figure 3 confirmed this to be the case across time in 
Nigeria. The level of exports could have been important as it was both a 
source of revenue and a variable that was easily observable by the 
colonial authorities. Table 1 also suggests that the identity of the coloniser 
or the ‘type’ of colonisation pursued could have affected the size of the 
white line. Another factor that could be important is the population density 
– in the context of poor transport and communication networks one would 
expect a relatively dense population to require a lower ratio of 
administrators to native population as ‘touring’ becomes easier. Authors – 
such as Kirk-Greene – who have stressed the supposed strength of the 
“steel frame” focus on the characteristics of the administrators themselves, 
in particular their “confidence and competence”. It is possible therefore 
that in some cases the ‘quality’ of administrators may have been a 
substitute for their quantity. 
The nature of pre-colonial political institutions may also have been 
important. Although it is generally accepted that indirect rule was more 
difficult (and perhaps had worse consequences) in less hierarchical 
societies, it is not clear whether or not colonising powers deliberately 
administered decentralised societies more closely. The degree to which 
collaboration would be effective must have been largely unknown at the 
beginning of the colonial period. Given the constraints faced by the 
colonial powers, and the relative shortness of the colonial period, it should 
not necessarily be assumed that they were able to adjust their 
administrative strategies to match pre-existing institutions. 
                                                                                                                                               
determined by underlying characteristics of each country which also affected the 
number of colonial administrators. 
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 A comparison of north and south Nigeria is worthwhile. By far the 
most populous colony in Africa,125 Nigeria exhibited a variety of pre-
colonial political systems. Broadly speaking the Muslim emirates of the 
north had well-established bureaucratic, administrative and judicial 
institutions (this was the home of indirect rule, or at least its explicit 
ideology), while society in the south was more fragmentary and less 
politically centralised.126 
Table 3 compares how the colonial administration developed in 
north and south Nigeria, from their amalgamation into a single colony (in 
1914) to independence. At the beginning of the period there were slightly 
more administrators in the north than the south. Both administrations 
grew, but from the mid-1920s until 1939 the north-south split was near 
50-50. According to official population estimates however, population in 
the north was higher and growing faster.127 Taking this into account, it 
appears the growth in the northern administration merely kept pace with 
population growth; the number of Africans per administrator remained 
roughly constant at just over 60,000. In the south, this figure started from 
a similar position but gradually declined – to around 45,000 by 1938. This 
could be evidence that the administration in the south was adjusting to its 
environment; that indirect rule proved difficult and the white line was 
strengthened as a result. Note also that the number of police was much 
                                                 
125 According to Kucyinski, Colonial population, Nigeria accounted for over 20% of the 
entire population of my sample. Its population was significantly larger than the whole of 
FWA and almost twice as large as the Belgian Congo. 
126 South Nigeria could be divided up further into the southeast where “political 
evolution had not advanced beyond the clan and family stage, and the idea of 
chieftainship had made little headway” and the southwest where there were “more or 
less highly-organised communities”, Annual report on the Southern provinces of 
Nigeria, p.1. Unfortunately, data that distinguishes between administrators in the 
southwest and the southeast was not available. 
127 As usual these statistics should be treated with caution, but the higher rate of growth 
in the north is plausible given there was significant in-migration from Niger. See Baier, 
An economic history of central Niger, pp.114-5. 
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 higher in the south than the north, suggesting greater use of coercion 
relative to collaboration.128  
 
Table 3. Administration of Nigeria, North vs. South 
    1912 1920 1924 1933 1937 1938 1955 1960 
Number of  north 148 144 158 192 174 187 223 243 
administrators south 130 121 159 200 179 185 308 324 
Share of total north 53.2% 54.3% 49.8% 49.0% 49.3% 50.3% 42.0% 42.9%
  south 46.8% 45.7% 50.2% 51.0% 50.7% 49.7% 58.0% 57.1%
Police north 555 - - - 885 - - - 
  south 942 - - - 1439 - - - 
Population  north 9,611,941 - 10,321,324 - - 11,940,307 - - 
Estimate south 7,858,689 - 8,114,294 - - 8,321,489 - - 
Africans per north 64,946 - 65,325 - - 63,852 - - 
administrator south 60,451 - 51,033 - - 44,981 - - 
 
Sources: Nigerian Blue books, Annual Report on the Nigeria Police, and, for 1955 and 
1960, Kirk-Greene, ‘The thin white line’. 
 
Another explanation is that the revenue-generating capacity of 
southern Nigeria was greater than the landlocked north. Cocoa, which 
was grown in the southwest, was more lucrative and spread earlier than 
the north’s main export crop: groundnuts. But the primary reason for 
amalgamation of the two territories was fiscal expediency; to merge a 
viable south with a near bankrupt north.129 So the relative strength of the 
northern administration did not increase in spite of financial transfers from 
south to north, suggesting that the emirs were indeed able to supply more 
traditional authority to the British than the southern chiefs. It should be 
noted however that after 1945 the southern administration expanded 
much faster than its northern counterpart, this could suggest that the 
process of adapting to pre-existing institutions was still incomplete by the 
‘high-noon of empire’. 
 
 
                                                 
128 The vast majority of these police were African. 
129 See Nicolson, The administration of Nigeria, p.181. 
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 III.2 Cross-Country Regression Analysis 
This section uses regression analysis to examine which of the 
factors identified above were the most important across all the colonies 
considered. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are run with the 
number of European administrators per 100,000 Africans in the late 
1930s as the dependent variable. On the right-hand side is the amount of 
revenue, and variables which could have affected the relative ease of 
maintaining ‘hegemony on a shoestring’. 
As discussed above, one would expect more administrators to be 
required where colonial policies placed a greater strain on indigenous 
society, in particular where a large proportion of land was expropriated or 
where there was an explicit aim to force Africans into the labour market – 
as in the settler and concession colonies. Three variables are used in an 
attempt to capture this: the size of the European population in the late 
1930s, the number of wage earners in 1957, and the ratio of GDP to GNP 
in 1960.130 This final variable – the so-called ‘colonial drain’ – was used 
by Canova and Bertocchi, who found it to be strongly and negatively 
associated with economic growth since independence.131 According to 
these authors, “the discrepancy between GNP and GDP reflects 
repatriated profits on foreign investment, royalties and direct exploitation 
activities, and therefore [its use] aims at measuring the degree of 
penetration that the metropolis exerted, roughly, at the end of the colonial 
period.”132 
Other variables aim to measure conditions unique to each colony 
which could have affected the ability of any given number of 
administrators to rule effectively. Such factors could include the 
population density, the nature of pre-existing institutions and the ‘quality’ 
                                                 
130 For further discussion and the source of each variable see app. I. 
131 Bertocchi and Canova, ‘Did Colonization matter?’ 
132 Ibid., p.1857. 
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 of administrators. The degree of pre-colonial political centralisation is 
measured using an index constructed from anthropological data by 
Gennaioli and Rainer.133 Each ethnic group is categorised as being either 
‘centralised’ or ‘fragmented’. The value for each country is then the 
proportion of the country’s population that belonged (in 1960) to an 
ethnic-linguistic group adjudged to have been ‘centralised’ historically.134 
Gubernatorial salary is used as a proxy for the overall ‘quality’ of the 
colonial administration. Jones has argued that the governor’s salary was 
set in the 1880s according to the amount of revenue the colony generated, 
but that it was not adjusted as revenue changed.135 It can therefore be 
treated as exogenous but was associated with the colony’s ‘prestige’ and 
thus the ‘quality’ of the officials that it attracted.136 The results of key 
regressions are reported in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
133 Gennaioli and Rainer, ‘Modern impact’. 
134 For further discussion of this variable see app. I. 
135 Jones, ‘History matters’. In the current sample there is in fact a weak negative 
correlation between the governor’s salary in 1913 and revenue/population in the 1930s. 
Jones’ data is not yet publically available, and so was collected independently following 
the same methodology. See app. I for further details and sources. 
136 The governor’s salary, rather than the salary of a provincial administrator, is used as 
while it is likely that they are correlated, the latter is more likely to reflect compensating 
factors. For example, higher pay for DCs could simply reflect a worse disease 
environment. Jones estimates wages equations to ensure that this is not the case for 
governors. 
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 Table 4. Explaining the Variation in the White Line Across Colonies 
Dependent variable is the white line – the number of administrators per 100,000 Africans in the 
late 1930s 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Revenue (per capita, in the 1930s) 2.505* 2.520* 2.233 1.476 1.843 2.247** 
 (1.419) (1.431) (1.333) (1.159) (1.347) (0.912) 
Wage earners  0.192** 0.255*** 0.265** 0.222** 0.213***
  (0.080) (0.084) (0.098) (0.086) (0.071) 
European population  0.592*** 0.443* 0.619*** 0.417 0.304 
  (0.204) (0.234) (0.211) (0.380) (0.233) 
‘Drain’  3.552 3.083 2.180 0.499  
  (4.741) (4.816) (5.182) (5.587)  
Governor's salary    -3.814* -5.613* -5.142 -4.593**
      (2.154) (3.028) (2.487) (1.707) 
Population density (in the 1930s)   -0.207 -0.135 -0.193  
   (0.276) (0.292) (0.308)  
Political centralisation   -0.087 1.636 1.870  
   (1.051) (2.116) (1.797)  
London    2.490 1.816  
    (1.544) (2.273)  
Brussels    0.622 1.090  
    (1.572) (2.273)  
West    2.050** 1.751  
    (0.871) (1.086)  
South    -1.169 -0.782  
    (1.691) (1.534)  
Equatorial    3.412** 2.765*  
    (1.305) (1.461)  
Openness      0.028 0.034 
     (0.039) (0.023) 
       
N 32 30 30 30 29 29 
R2 0.20 0.71 0.79 0.84 0.85 0.80 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level 
denoted by *,** and *** respectively. Constant terms were included but not reported. 
For data description and sources see text and app. I. The sample is not quite complete 
as the following data is missing: revenue for Madagascar, governor’s salary for 
Zimbabwe, number of wage earners for Namibia, and value of trade for Sierre Leone. 
London and Brussels or dummy variables for colonisation by Britain and Belgium 
respectively (Paris is the omitted case). West, South and Equatorial are regional 
dummies (East is omitted). See app. III for regional classification of colonies. 
 
Column 1 confirms the expected positive relationship between 
revenue-generating capacity and the closeness of administration. This 
factor accounts for around 20 percent of the variation in the white line. 
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 The coefficient has a similar magnitude when additional regressors are 
included. The significance is not as high as one might expect however. 
This could be because almost half of the sample comprises former 
territories of FWA and FEA. These federations had aggregate fiscal 
systems and a high rotation of administrators among the separate 
colonies as a matter of policy.137 
Column 2 adds the three variables which are intended to capture 
the degree of conflict between colonial policy and indigenous interests. All 
three coefficients have the expected sign and their inclusion adds a great 
deal of explanatory power; the R2 increases to over 0.7. While the 
coefficients on both the number of Europeans and the percentage of 
wage earners are individually significant, the so-called ‘colonial drain’ is 
not. 
Column 3 includes three extra variables which could have affected 
the ability of the white line to rule effectively. The coefficient on the 
governor’s salary is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. This 
suggests that quality of administrators could indeed have been a 
substitute for their quantity. Population density has the expected sign – 
negative – but is not statistically significant. That pre-colonial political 
centralisation does not seem to have any effect on the number of 
administrators is of particular interest. Indeed, in columns 4 and 5 the 
estimated coefficient is even positive. This supports Fields’ view that 
“officials ruled indirectly… whether or not the available institutions were 
readily adaptable to this use.”138 
Column 4 adds dummy variables for the region and identity of the 
coloniser. The coloniser fixed effects are insignificant suggesting that the 
                                                 
137 Hailey, African survey, pp.236-8. The individual territories also had their own local 
budgets. For details of how colonial revenue was estimated for each colony see app. I. 
138 Fields, Revival and Rebellion, p.33. This suggests that the previously observed 
evolution of the southern Nigerian administration during the interwar period was not the 
general rule across the continent. 
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 other variables adequately explain the variation in the white line across 
colonial powers.139 Somewhat surprisingly, the dummies for location in 
west and equatorial Africa are both positive and significant.140 The value 
of trade (at the end of the colonial period) is controlled for in column 5. 
Recall that this could be important as trade was closely associated with 
revenue and increasing exports was often the principal objective of 
colonial regimes.141 This variable – although not individually significant – 
causes the coefficients on both west and equatorial to reduce, although 
the equatorial dummy remains significant at the 10 percent level. This 
could be driven by exceptional circumstances in the Belgian Congo, 
perhaps resulting from international pressures to keep up appearances in 
the post-Leopold era.142 Another noteworthy effect of controlling for 
openness is that the coefficient on the size of the European population 
loses its significance – a result that remains in column 6 when previously 
insignificant variables are dropped. This casts doubt on the existence of a 
causal link between the number of European residents and the white line. 
Although not reported in Table 4, other variables which could have 
affected post-colonial economic performance were also considered.143 
These include income in 1960, various measures of education in the 
1950s, capital inflow (including for railways) during the colonial period, the 
extent of urbanisation in 1960, the number of Christians in 1960, ethnic 
                                                 
139 The coefficient on London is actually positive, suggesting that the observed 
propensity for British colonies to be the least closely administered is entirely explicable. 
Higher governor’s salary in British colonies and thus the ‘quality’ of administrators is 
particularly important here. This in part supports those – such as Kirk-Greene – who 
romanticise the qualities of the ‘generic DO’. 
140 This is most surprising for ‘peasant’ west Africa, perhaps the region most closely 
associated with indirect rule. 
141 It is possible that revenue in the late 1930s does not accurately reflect the long-tern 
revenue generating capacity of each colony, and that openness to trade at the end of 
the colonial period is a better measure of this. 
142 When the Belgian Congo is dropped the equatorial dummy loses its significance. 
143 If these factors are correlated with the white line then they could bias its estimated 
effect of subsequent economic performance. 
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 diversity, and being landlocked.144 None of these factors were found to be 
strongly correlated with the white line or add any explanatory power when 
included in column 6.145 
Over 80 percent of the variation in the white line can be accounted 
for by relatively few variables.146 Moreover, the factors that have been 
identified as important are unlikely to have had a strong direct effect on 
economic performance in the period since independence.147 This 
increases the likelihood that the relationship between the white line and 
growth (as seen in Figure 2) is causal. 
 
 
IV 
If indirect rule has had long-term and negative economic legacies, 
one would expect a positive relationship between the closeness of 
colonial administration and economic growth since independence. Recall 
also that indirect rule is thought to have been most effective where pre-
colonial institutions were most state-like, so one would expect the 
relationship between the white line and growth to depend on the degree 
of pre-colonial state development. In particular, in stateless or fragmented 
societies the benefits of closer administration would be greater. 
These general predictions are supported by Table 5, which 
constructs four groups based on the closeness of administration and the 
                                                 
144 See app. I for a description and source of each variable. Education could be 
especially important: Grier, ‘Colonial legacies’, attributes most of the variation in the 
performance of former British and French colonies in west Africa to differences in their 
level of education at the end of the colonial period. 
145 See app. V for details. 
146 Although not reported in tab. 4, three variables alone – revenue, wage earners and 
governor’s salary – account for three quarters of the variation. 
147 The size of the labour market might be an exception, although the correlation 
between growth since independence and the number of wage earners in 1957 is weak. 
There is no correlation between colonial revenue and growth since independence. See 
app. VI. 
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 nature of pre-colonial institutions.148 In general, countries with fewer 
administrators grew slower, but the number of administrators appears to 
matter much more where pre-existing political systems were fragmented. 
 
Table 5. Pre-Colonial Institutions and the White Line: Difference in 
Differences 
Pre-colonial political system 
  
Relatively centralised Relatively fragmented 
Difference 
in growth 
rate 
Benin, Botswana, 
Mauritania, Lesotho, 
Senegal, Swaziland, 
Zambia 
Gabon, Gambia, 
Kenya  
Relatively 
Thick 
Mean growth rate =1.39 
(standard deviation =2.30) 
Mean growth rate 
=1.50 
(standard 
deviation =0.62) 
-0.11 
Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda 
Burkina Faso, 
CAR, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone Relatively 
thin 
Mean growth rate =0.54 
(standard deviation =0.79) 
Mean growth rate 
=-0.02 (standard 
deviation =1.09) 
0.56 
 
The 
white 
line 
Difference 
in growth 
rate 
0.85 1.52 -0.67 
 
Regression analysis allows for a more sophisticated examination of 
the relationship between the white line and economic performance. OLS 
regressions are run with the average annual growth of per capita GDP 
from 1960 (or independence if earlier) to 1992 as the dependent variable. 
Table 6 reports the key results. 
                                                 
148 The sample was ranked by both the closeness of administration and the share of 
the population belonging to a ‘centralised’ ethnic group (as defined by Gennaioli and 
Rainer, ‘Modern impact’), in each case the middle quartile (eight observations) was 
then discarded. A country categorised as relatively ‘fragmented’ with a ‘thin’ white line 
therefore lies in the bottom 12 both in terms of the number of administrators and the 
extent of political centralisation. 
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 Table 6. The Relationship Between the White Line and Post-Colonial 
Economic Growth 
Dependent variable is the average per capita GDP growth from 1960 (or 
independence if earlier) to 1992
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial income  -1.471** -1.326 -1.342 -1.514* -1.540* 
  (0.635) (0.831) (0.850) (0.742) (0.772) 
Low opportunities  -1.126** -1.419** -1.302** 
-
1.555*** 
-
1.502***
  (0.410) (0.518) (0.469) (0.478) (0.508) 
Ethnic diversity  0.028 -0.738 -0.809 0.095 -0.293 
  (1.224) (1.181) (1.237) (1.089) (1.305) 
'Drain'  
-
16.89***
-
16.59***
-
16.09*** 
-
20.20*** 
-
19.26***
  (5.844) (5.180) (5.072) (5.620) (6.217) 
Political centralisation  0.603 -0.318 -0.417 -0.180 -0.130 
     (0.921) (0.927) (0.992) (0.630) (0.703) 
European population    0.211 0.231 0.206 0.170 
      (0.212) (0.200) (0.191) (0.211) 
Revenue   -0.826 -0.806 -0.781* -0.840 
   (0.570) (0.653) (0.424) (0.534) 
Wage earners    0.027 0.018 0.028* 0.029 
      (0.016) (0.044) (0.015) (0.017) 
Governor's salary    0.578   
    (0.965)   
The white line 0.173*** 0.204*** 0.148*** 0.169* 0.134*** 0.150***
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.040) (0.088) (0.036) (0.049) 
The white line * 
political     -0.177** -0.191**
   centralisation     (0.066) (0.068) 
       
Coloniser fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
N 32 31 30 29 30 30 
R2 0.15 0.60 0.74 0.74 0.80 0.81 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level 
denoted by *,** and *** respectively. Constant terms were included but not reported. 
See app. I for description and source of all variables. Coloniser fixed effects are 
dummy variables for colonisation by Britain and Belgian (France is the omitted case). 
When the white line and political centralisation are interacted, the white line is centred 
around zero and political centralisation is standardised to have mean zero and 
standard deviation one. This is to reduce co-linearity and ease interpretation. The 
sample is not quite complete as the following data is missing: growth for Namibia, 
ethnic diversity for Swaziland, revenue for Madagascar and governor’s salary for 
Zimbabwe. 
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 The white line is strongly and positively correlated with growth. 
Colonies that were relatively closely administered have tended to grow 
faster since they gained independence. The coefficient remains highly 
significant (and roughly unchanged in magnitude) when a variety of other 
factors are controlled for. 
Note that coloniser fixed effects were not included in order to 
maintain more degrees of freedom. When the same regressions were run 
with these dummy variables included, they did not add extra explanatory 
power or affect the key results (see column 6).149 That the coloniser 
dummies are insignificant is contrary to some previous studies.150 
Column 2 includes some country characteristics which could have 
affected growth: initial income, a dummy for ‘low opportunities’,151 ethnic 
diversity,152 GDP/GNP in 1960 (the so-called ‘colonial drain’) and the 
measure of pre-colonial political centralisation used previously. The 
results support the findings of Canova and Bertocchi (that more 
‘extractive’ colonial regimes have had worse legacies), but not those of 
Easterly and Levine – there is no strong link between ethnic diversity and 
economic growth. There does seem to be some evidence of ‘club 
convergence’ within sub-Saharan Africa – initially richer countries have 
tended to grow slower.153 
Columns 3 and 4 control for factors which were shown above to be 
important determinants of the white line. Since these variables were so 
successful in explaining the variation in the white line, co-linearity is a 
                                                 
149 The same can be said for the regional fixed effects. 
150 For example, Canova and Bertocchi, ‘Did colonization matter?’ and La Porta et al., 
‘Government’. Although Olsson, ‘Institutional legacy’, also found coloniser fixed effects 
to be insignificant. 
151 This takes the value one when the country is landlocked and resource scarce, see 
app. I and III. 
152 As defined by Easterly and Levine, ‘Growth tragedy’, see app. 1. 
153 The coefficient on initial income is only significant after this inclusion of the white line, 
convergence is therefore conditional on the number of administrators. 
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 problem.154 This makes it difficult to identify the individual effects of each 
variable.155 It is therefore unsurprising that the white line is reduced in 
significance in column 4 (where all four determinant variables are 
included). That the coefficient on the white line remains roughly 
unchanged in magnitude suggests that the characteristics which 
determined the number of administrators have had little direct effect on 
growth, or have affected growth in counteracting directions.156 Contrary to 
AJR’s argument, the coefficient on the size of the European population, 
although positive, is never statistically significant – a result that is not 
simply driven by co-linearity.157 Including the degree of openness at the 
end of the colonial period (not reported), did not affect the coefficient on 
the white line or add explanatory power.  
Column 5 presents perhaps the strongest evidence that the 
relationship between the white line and growth is indeed casual. An 
interaction term between the white line and pre-colonial political 
centralisation is included – this allows the estimated relationship between 
the white line and growth to depend on the nature of pre-colonial 
institutions. As predicted, the interaction term is negative and statistically 
significant. The regression results imply that at the mean level of state 
development, the marginal effect of the white line on growth is around 
0.13, but at one standard deviation below the mean level of state 
development this more than doubles to 0.31.158 Conversely, this suggests 
                                                 
154 See app. VI for a correlation matrix of the relevant variables. 
155 In col. 3, the number of Europeans, the number of wage earners and revenue are all 
individually insignificant, but a test for their joint significance is positive. 
156 For example a larger labour market and greater taxation were both associated with 
closer administration. It is possible that a larger labour market has been beneficial but 
that greater colonial taxation has been detrimental, and together these effects have 
more or less cancelled each other out. 
157 If the number of Europeans is added to col. 2 (with fewer controls), it is still not 
individually significant at conventional levels, while the white line remains significant at 
the 1% level. 
158 Note that to ease interpretation the political centralisation variable, when interacted 
with the white line, has been standardised to have a standard deviation of one. 
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 that the effects of indirect rule were smaller or even non-existent at higher 
levels of pre-colonial political centralisation.159 While the limitations of this 
indicator of pre-colonial political centralisation should be acknowledged, it 
is likely that any measurement error creates a downward bias.160 The 
result is robust to alternative measures of pre-colonial political 
centralisation.161 Other than the causal hypothesis, there is no obvious 
reason why the relationship between the white line and growth should 
depend on the level of pre-colonial state development in this way.162 
The results are economically as well as statistically significant. 
Taking the results literally, Sierra Leone – which had relatively 
decentralised pre-colonial political systems – would have grown one 
percentage point faster every year since independence had it been 
administered as closely as neighbouring Guinea.163 This strongly 
suggests that colonialism (and pre-colonial institutions) mattered – and 
still matter – for growth.164 
Table 7 suggests that the legacy of the thin white line is not 
diminishing. The estimated effects of all the colonial variables on growth 
from independence to 1973 (the first oil shock) and to 1992 are compared. 
All the control variables appear to diminish in importance (they reduce in 
                                                 
159 It might even be possible that at extremely high levels of political centralisation, 
increasing the number of administrators could have a negative effect on growth. 
However, even where pre-colonial institutions were the most state-like, the estimated 
effect of the white line on growth is not significantly less than zero. App. VII, fig. A1 
shows precisely how the estimated effect of the white line on growth varies with the 
level of political centralisation. 
160 One limitation is that it gives just an average figure for each country, when in reality 
the degree of pre-colonial political centralisation could vary greatly within the territories 
of modern day states. But if Nigeria – the most obvious example of this – is dropped 
the significance of the interaction term only increases (to the 1% level). 
161 See app. VIII. 
162This is also consistent with Bardhan’s finding that state antiquity is a good predictor 
of present-day institutional quality, Bardhan, ‘Institutions matter’. 
163 This amounts to an extra two administrators per 100,000 Africans. The calculation is 
based on the estimates reported in col. 5. 
164 This is not to say that policy since independence is irrelevant, although variables 
such as the average black market premium and years of civil war were not found to 
add any explanatory power when included in col. 5. 
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 magnitude and statistical significance). This is reassuring regarding the 
quality of data. In contrast, the estimated effect of the white line remains 
unchanged.165 Of course this is also consistent with the explanation that 
the correlation between the white line and growth is driven by unobserved 
and time-invariant country characteristics, but the extent to which the 
relationship depends on pre-colonial institutions does diminish. This lends 
further support to the causal hypothesis. 
 
Table 7. The Legacy of the White Line Through Time 
Estimated effect on growth Variable Up to 1973 Up to 1992 
‘Drain’ -33.67 (-4.15) 
-20.20 
(-3.59) 
European population 0.653 (2.90) 
0.206 
(1.08) 
Wage earners 0.068 (2.92) 
0.028 
(1.90) 
Revenue -2.837 (-5.50) 
-0.781 
(-1.84) 
The white line 0.124 (1.30) 
0.134 
(3.76) 
white line*political 
centralisation 
-0.321 
(-3.42) 
-0.177 
(-2.69) 
N 29 30 
R2 0.79 0.80 
 
Note: the estimates are obtained using the same specification as col. 5 in tab. 6. T-
statistics (calculated using robust standard errors) are in parentheses. Growth ‘up to 
1973’ is from 1960, growth ‘up to 1992’ is from 1960 or independence (which ever is 
earliest). See app. I for a description of all variables. 
 
Recall that the literature on the legacies of indirect rule tends to 
focus either on fractionalisation and neo-patrimonialism or competition 
and uncertainty over land tenure. Ascertaining the relative importance of 
                                                 
165 That the white line’s T-statistic is relatively low for the growth up to 1973 regression 
does not mean that the white line was unimportant for growth, just that a significant 
effect cannot be identified at the mean level of political centralisation. 
 
44
 these potential causal mechanisms is difficult. It is likely that they were 
both at play, and in an interlinked manner.166 
In could be argued that indirect rule having worse consequences in 
the context of fragmented pre-colonial political systems is consistent with 
both stories. It is certainly true that the ‘search for tradition’ was more 
difficult under these circumstances and the necessary ‘inventions’ more 
open to challenge – this supports Berry’s line of argument. One could 
also argue that the pre-colonial institutions to overcome social distance – 
which indirect rule undermined as Leeson has documented – were more 
important where political systems were less state-like. 
But this is contrary to Englebert’s argument that ‘state illegitimacy’ 
leads to lower ‘developmental capacity’. He states that “societies with 
strong state traditions seem to find the post-colonial state less acceptable, 
less legitimate, more arbitrary than their more lineage-orientated 
counterparts that can be thought of as providing the modern state with an 
institutional blank page.”167 Englebert’s argument is misleading because it 
is based on the faulty assumption that the colonial powers were able to 
import the institutions of their choosing. In reality they were forced to rely 
upon the authority generated by traditional African institutions, and where 
this was most difficult – in the absence of an established social hierarchy 
– European ‘colonialism-on-the-cheap’ has been the most detrimental. It 
appears that Berry’s argument has more merit than those that only 
emphasise the political legacies of colonial rule. 
 
 
 
                                                 
166 Drawing a clear line between these different stories is to simplify the arguments put 
forth in the literature. For example, Berry also highlights the political aspects of the 
problem and the ‘fractionalisation’ that indirect rule generated; she describes 
competition over resources as “the every-day politics of rent-seeking”, ‘Every-day 
politics’. 
167 Englebert, ‘Pre-colonial institutions’, p.20. 
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 Table 8. Private Versus Public Investment. 
  Private investment Public investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial income -1.121 1.027   -2.761 1.024 
  (3.527) (5.557)   (1.697) (0.826) 
Ethnic 
diversity  1.877 5.908   -5.096* 0.476 
  (3.141) (5.974)   (2.618) (3.195) 
‘Drain’  -54.71* -76.90**   0.713 -26.27 
  (30.60) (35.22)   (36.22) (25.62) 
European    1.329    1.832* 
  population   (1.389)    (0.998) 
Wage earners   0.073    -0.006 
   (0.068)    (0.040) 
Revenue   -4.216    -5.621*** 
   (3.716)    (1.517) 
White line 0.922*** 1.102*** 0.927*** 0.322 0.527 0.303 
 (0.227) (0.251) (0.248) (0.194) (0.308) (0.198) 
N 24 24 23 25 25 24 
R2 0.31 0.42 0.50 0.10 0.29 0.64 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level 
denoted by *,** and *** respectively. Constant terms were included but not reported. 
Estimation technique is OLS. For description of variables and sources see app. I. 
 
This is also suggested by an examination of the relationship 
between the white line and private – as opposed to public – investment 
since independence. Table 8 shows that the white line is much more 
strongly correlated with private than public investment: the coefficient on 
the white line is much higher in magnitude and statistical significance in 
columns 1-3. In contrast, the hypothesis that the white line has had no 
effect on public investment cannot be rejected. 168 Given the small sample 
size, not too much should be read into these results. But again the 
evidence seems to be more consistent with Berry’s – as opposed to 
Englebert or Lange’s – argument, and suggests that the forces Goldstein 
and Udry found to be operating in Ghana could be a work across much of 
the continent. 
                                                 
168 Another noteworthy result is that higher colonial taxation is strongly associated with 
lower public (but not private) investment since independence. 
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 V 
V.1 The Difference Between the White Line and Indirect Rule 
Thus far it has been assumed that the estimated effect of close 
administration is negatively related to the effect of indirect rule. But clearly 
there are factors which could have affected the degree of collaboration for 
any given number of administrators, and thus the stability of this 
relationship across different colonies. Although there is considerable 
overlap, these factors are not necessarily the same – or acting in the 
same direction – as those which determined the number of administrators. 
For example, where colonial rule placed more strain on indigenous 
society, both more administrators and more collaboration for any given 
number of administrators could have been required. While no clear causal 
link between the number of European residents and the number of 
administrators was established, in the settler colonies any given number 
of administrators may have collaborated with African elites less.169 But 
given that these (and other similar) factors were controlled for in the 
regression analysis, the relationship between the effect of the white line 
and the effect of collaboration should be roughly stable across the sample, 
making it possible to correctly infer the effect of indirect rule from the 
estimation results. 
One factor that was not controlled for however is the extent of 
coercion. It is possible that coercion and collaboration were to some 
extent substitutes. Robinson believes that “the military element in French 
imperialism in north and west Africa … often made it less dependent on 
mediators than the British.”170 Lange found the correlation between his 
measure of the extent of indirect rule and the number of police per capita 
                                                 
169 The correlation between Lange’s measure of legal penetration and the number of 
Europeans is -0.88. 
170 Robinson, ‘non-European foundations’, pp.122-3. 
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 to be -0.82.171 It is possible that direct colonial repression has negatively 
affected long-term economic performance; but it is likely that the number 
of police and military is positively correlated to the number of 
administrators.172 That a strong positive relationship was found between 
the number of administrators and subsequent growth is thus in spite of 
more administrators being associated with greater coercion. If anything, 
using the white line probably underestimates the negative effects of 
collaboration.173 
It is perhaps worthwhile to extrapolate Lange’s measure of indirect 
rule to the rest of the sample. Broadly, one would expect the extent of 
collaboration to depend negatively on the amount of resources available 
to the colonial government, positively on the overall difficulty (or strategic 
importance) of maintaining order and negatively on the political 
desirability of ruling directly. By regressing Lange’s index on revenue 
(which constrained the possibility of direct rule), Canova and Bertocchi’s 
‘colonial drain’ (which could have affected the difficulty or importance of 
maintaining control by any given means) and the number of Europeans 
(which influenced the desirability of indirect rule relative to other possible 
means of maintaining hegemony) the following equation is obtained: 174 
 
Extent of indirect rule = -47.65 – 6.07*Revenue + 3.64*Drain – 12.25*Europeans 
 
                                                 
171 Lange, ‘British colonial legacies’, p.909. Within mainland Africa this correlation is -
0.76. Recall also that there were significantly more police employed in southern Nigeria 
than northern Nigeria, see tab. 3.  
172 Across British colonies the correlation between the number of police and military per 
capita and the white line is 0.51. Unfortunately, data for the number of police and 
military across the whole sample was unavailable. 
173 One slight caveat is that the number of Africans directly employed (as clerks or 
messengers) by the colonial administration (which is also likely to have been positively 
correlated with the white line) could have worked in the opposite direction – positively 
affecting subsequent economic growth. 
174 Note that to ease interpretation all three dependent variables have been 
standardised to have standard deviation one. 
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 Given a basis of just 14 observations, this exercise should be 
viewed as entirely tentative. That said, all three variables have the 
expected sign, are individually significant and together account for almost 
90 percent of the variation in Lange’s index. The estimated extent of 
indirect rule (obtained from this equation) is even more strongly related to 
economic performance since independence than the white line. Indeed, 
Figure 4 shows that half the variation in present-day income can be 
accounted for by this estimate.175 Again this suggests that using the white 
line underestimates the negative legacies of indirect rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
175 The adjusted R2 is greater when this linear combination of revenue, number of 
settlers and colonial drain is regressed on present-day income than when the three 
variables are regressed separately. While this clearly indicates a study along the lines 
of Lange’s which focuses on Africa (and on economic rather than just political 
outcomes) would be worthwhile, recall the major limitation of Lange’s measure: that it 
fails to distinguish between legitimate and ‘created’ chiefs, and thus how the impact of 
indirect rule varies with pre-colonial institutions. 
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 Figure 4. Present-Day Income and the Estimated Extent of Indirect Rule 
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Correlation = -0.71, T-statistic = -5.46, R2 = 0.50 
Source: present-day income from Maddison, Historical statistics. 
 
That the extent of indirect rule appears to be strongly and 
negatively associated with the number of Europeans could explain why 
no robust relationship was found between this variable and economic 
growth since independence. Contrary to AJR, perhaps the most important 
positive legacy of European settlement in Africa stems from the tendency 
for colonial administrators in the settler colonies to rely less on 
collaboration with Africans as a means of maintaining their hegemony. 
 
V.2 Further Implications 
Nathan Nunn has identified a negative relationship between the 
estimated number of slaves exported from each African country between 
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 1400 and 1900 and their current income.176 He claims that this correlation 
is the result of a causal relationship operating either through increased 
ethnic fractionalisation, weakened political structures or the evolution of a 
“culture of mistrust.”177 Historians of Africa tend to be sceptical regarding 
these potential causal mechanisms, if there is no causal link however, the 
observed correlation (assuming it is not merely an artefact of poor quality 
data) still needs an explanation.178 
 
Table 9. The Slave Trade Versus Indirect Rule. 
    Dependent variable is log of per capita GDP in 2000 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Slave exports  
-
0.108*** 
-
0.145*** -0.071 -0.055 -0.248*** -0.087 -0.067  
    (0.037) (0.044) (0.047) (0.044) (0.088) (0.094) (0.095)  
Estimated extent    -0.018* -0.022**  
-
0.020** 
-
0.024**
-
0.024***
   of indirect rule   (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Geography    
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Coloniser fixed     
effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Estimation 
technique OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS - 
N  42 33 32 32 33 32 32 32 
R2   0.63 0.53 0.67 0.60 0.49 0.64 0.59 0.63 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level denoted by 
*,** and *** respectively. Constant terms were included. ‘Geography controls’ are 
distance from equator, longitude, lowest monthly rainfall, average maximum humidity, 
average minimum temperature and ln(coastline/area). Coloniser fixed effects are dummy 
variables for colonisation by Britain and Belgium (France is omitted), except in col. 1 
where Nunn’s dummy variables are used. The estimation technique refers to the method 
of estimation for slave exports. Where two staged least squares (2SLS) is used, the 
slave export variable is the fitted value obtained by regressing the slave exports estimate 
on Nunn’s instruments: the distance from the Atlantic, the distance from the Indian 
Ocean, the distance from the Sahara and the distance from the Red Sea. In col. 1, 
Nunn’s sample is used (which includes all of mainland sub-Saharan Africa). All data, 
except the estimated extent of indirect rule, is taken from Nunn, ‘Long-term effects’. 
                                                 
176 Nunn, ‘Long-term effects’. 
177 In his original paper, Nunn favours the first two explanations. But he has since 
revised to argument to favour mistrust, Nunn and Wantchekon, ‘Origins of mistrust’. 
178 See Austin, ‘The reversal of fortune thesis’, for a qualitative critique of Nunn’s 
argument. 
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 Nunn describes colonisation as “the other significant event in 
Africa’s past.”179 Yet in his principal regressions, the colonial experience 
is only controlled for using dummy variables for the identity of the 
coloniser. This seems dubious given that it has been shown above – and 
by some others previously – that, statistically speaking, the identity of the 
coloniser seems to have had almost no effect. Perhaps a more 
appropriate control for differing experiences under colonialism would be 
the estimated extent of indirect rule discussed above (recall that this is 
merely a linear combination of three variables from the colonial period). 
Table 9 shows what happens to Nunn’s estimates when this control is 
used instead of (and in addition to) coloniser fixed effects. 
When the estimated extent of indirect rule is included in Nunn’s 
regressions, the coefficient on his estimate for the number of slave 
exports is greatly reduced in magnitude and completely loses its 
statistical significance. The same pattern occurs – only more pronounced 
– when Nunn’s two staged least squares (2SLS) procedure is followed. In 
contrast, the coefficient on the estimated extent of indirect rule is stable in 
magnitude and consistently significant. 
An alternative story, consistent with the correlation Nunn observes, 
is that decentralised societies suffered more from slave raids and then 
also suffered more under indirect rule, and that it is the later experience 
which has had the more pronounced economic legacy. Nunn himself 
identifies a correlation between slave exports and pre-colonial state 
development.180 He sees the direction of causation running from slave 
trades to political instability and weakened states.181 It is more plausible 
however that those areas with less centralised political systems were 
                                                 
179 Nunn, ‘Long-term effects’, p. 154. 
180 The correlation between Nunn’s estimate of slave exports and Rainer and 
Gennaioli’s measure of state development is (in my sample) -0.47, the T-statistic is -
2.95 and the R2 is 0.22. 
181 Nunn, ‘Long-term effects’, pp. 165-6. 
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 ‘selected into’ the slave trades. “Most of the African rulers involved sought 
to protect their own subjects from enslavement while capturing, buying 
and selling or re-selling outsiders.”182 Some kingdoms (such as Benin and 
Kongo) even withdrew from the Atlantic slave trade altogether,183 while 
some small states (such as Asante, Dahomey and Oyo) grew stronger 
because of their participation in the slave trade.184 It is therefore the 
regions that were least politically centralised originally that ended up 
exporting relatively more of their population. Lower population densities in 
these areas could then have increased the difficulties associated with 
state development, so that they remained politically fragmented at the 
imposition of colonial rule. As shown above, colonial rule has had 
significant and negative economic legacies, and due to the nature of 
indirect rule these legacies have been the most detrimental where pre-
colonial political fragmentation was high. 
 
 
VI 
Recent quantitative work by economists and political scientists 
supports the view that the colonialism (or the pre-colonial slave trade) has 
had long-term economic legacies for Africa. While highlighting the 
importance of institutions, this literature has so far failed to adequately 
reflect the complexities of the causal mechanisms involved. This is 
principally because the explanations put forth do not allow for the “power 
of indigenous agency … as a determinant of institutional choice”185 This 
omission is striking given that the thin white line fundamentally relied 
upon collaboration with Africans. 
                                                 
182 Austin, ‘The reversal of fortune thesis’, p.1005. 
183 Ibid., p.1004. 
184 Ibid., p.1005. 
185 Ibid., p.1020. 
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 Europeans lacked both the capacity and the incentive to import 
their own institutions or ‘invent’ new ones. Colonial rule was not a 
“fundamental rupture”, but neither was it “a mere interlude in the placid 
history of the continent.”186 The institutional environment of colonial and 
post-colonial Africa evolved through a series of interactions and 
competition between Europeans and Africans and, more importantly, 
between Africans and Africans; it was “a process marked by 
reinterpretation that was neither spurious nor false.”187 The weakness of 
these ‘reinterpreted’ institutions does not therefore lie in their extractive 
nature, foreignness or illegitimacy per se but the competitive manner in 
which they are derived: “in the long-run, it was the process of debate, 
rather than any particular interpretation, which shaped the actual exercise 
of power at all levels of society and its impact on conditions of access to 
resources.”188 
It has been shown that a key variable in this process – the relative 
thinness of the white line – is strongly related to economic performance 
since independence, and in a way which depends on the nature of pre-
colonial political institutions. While it cannot be conclusively proved that 
this correlation is the result of a causal relationship, the evidence is 
certainly consistent with this hypothesis and suggests that what mattered 
was not the ‘strategy’ of colonisation per se but how Africans responded 
to it within the pre-existing institutional environment. To further illuminate 
the legacies of colonialism within a quantitative framework it is therefore 
necessary to improve our understanding (and measurement) of the 
multiple facets of pre-colonial societies. 
The most instructive way to consider the long-term impact of 
colonialism on African society is the framework put forward by Sara Berry. 
                                                 
186 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, p.11. 
187 Spear, ‘Neo-Traditionalism’, p.4, footnote 2. 
188 Berry, No Condition, p.101. 
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 The ‘search for tradition’ was never straightforward, particularly where the 
white line was weak or where the sought-for ‘tradition’ simply did not exist. 
In these circumstances, indirect rule – rather than creating the desired 
stability – increased competition, conflict and uncertainty over access to 
productive resources and political power. This has forced farmers and 
entrepreneurs to participate in the ‘every-day politics of rent-seeking’ at 
the expense of directly productive investment. 
This complements rather than contradicts those arguments that 
emphasise colonialism’s effect on post-colonial political economy. The 
fragmented nature of many African societies today is at least partly due to 
the ‘faction fights’ inadvertently generated by indirect rule. As well as 
directly undermining economic activity (and thus government revenue) 
these local disputes must have made it even more difficult for small-scale 
farmers to act collectively, perhaps contributing to the supposed ‘urban 
bias’ of economic policy.189 Moreover, “local conflicts can accelerate the 
failure of states”;190 in the late twentieth century African states 
increasingly “disintegrated and fell prey to particularistic and factional 
struggles.”191 Competing claims to land between and within communities 
“sowed the political landscape with multitudinous opportunities for 
conflict.”192 In short, post-colonial Africa has too often been characterised 
by markets that fail to allocate resources efficiently and by governments 
that only exacerbate the situation; both these features can at least in part 
be traced back to the peculiar effects of European ‘colonialism-on-the-
cheap’. 
 
 
                                                 
189 As Robert Bates famously argued in Markets and States (1981). The failure of 
Ghana’s cocoa farmers to form a viable coalition after independence perhaps illustrates 
this point. 
190 Bates, When things fell apart, p.92. 
191 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, p.14. 
192 Bates, When things fell apart, pp.75-93, quote p.75. 
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 APPENDIX I: Data Description and Sources 
 
Black Market Premium 
Log of 1 + foreign exchange black market premium, average for 1960 to 
1990. Source: Englebert, ‘Pre-colonial institutions’. Data not available for 
Namibia. 
Capital Inflow During the Colonial Period 
Per capita foreign capital invested from beginning of colonial period to 
1936. Source Frankel, Capital investment. Only available for British 
colonies (excluding Swaziland and Lesotho) and the Belgian Congo. 
Christians 
Number of Christians (Protestant and Catholic) / total population in 1960. 
Source: Englebert, ‘Pre-colonial institutions’. Data not available for 
Swaziland or Namibia. 
Civil War 
Number of years between independence and 1995 during which episodes 
of civil war were experienced. Source: Englebert, ‘Pre-colonial institutions’. 
Colonial Identity 
The identity of the coloniser at the time of independence. So former 
German colonies Tanzania and Namibia are classified as British, Togo as 
French and Ruanda-Urundi as Belgian. Cameroon is classified as French 
(even though parts of the present-day country were under British 
administration). 
Drain 
GDP/GNP in the earliest year for which data is available, which is 1960 
except in the following: Gambia (1966), Guinea (1970), Mali (1967), 
Namibia (1970), Senegal (1968), Sierra Leone (1964) and Tanzania 
(1970). Source: Heston and Summers. Note that while Canova and 
Bertocchi use GNP/GDP, here the reciprocal is taken to ease 
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 interpretation. As this ratio increases so does the supposed economic 
penetration of the metropole in the colony. 
Education 
Primary and secondary school gross enrolment rates in 1950. Source: 
Easterly et al., ‘Good policy’. Data not available for Benin, Burundi, Chad, 
Guinea, Lesotho, Mali, Namibia or Swaziland. 
Literacy rate in 1955. Source: Morrison et al., Black Africa, tab. 4.11. Data 
not available for Zimbabwe or Namibia. 
Ethnic Diversity 
The probability any individual will be randomly matched with a member of 
a different ethno-linguistic group (in the 1960s). Source: Englebert, ‘Pre-
colonial institutions’. As used by Easterly and Levine, ‘Growth tragedy’, 
and based upon the soviet Atlas Norodov Mirna. Data not available for 
Swaziland or Namibia. 
European Population 
Log (number of European population/total population) in the 1930s. 
Sources: Kuczynski, Colonial population, for all British colonies, the 
Belgian Congo, Madagascar, Togo, and Cameroon (for 1935). Annuire 
statistique de l’AEF (1936) for the 4 territories of FEA and Exposition 
coloniale internationale de 1931 for the 8 territories of FWA. Kucyinski 
only gives the aggregate African population for Ruanda-Urundi, which is 
divided between Rwanda and Burundi according to their relative 
populations in 1960 (source: World Bank, World development indicators). 
The number of Europeans in the two territories is given separately in 
Rapport sur L’Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi (1936). It should 
be noted that in many cases (especially in West Africa) the Europeans 
listed in the censuses were not ‘settlers’ in the sense that they had 
permanently migrated from Europe. 
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 Initial Income 
Log of GDP per capita in 1960 (or independence if earlier). Source: 
Englebert, ‘Pre-Colonial Institutions’. Data not available for Namibia. 
Governor’s Salary 
Log of the governor’s salary in 1913. Sources: Colonial office list for 1913 
for all British colonies except Tanzania (taken from the 1921 list) and 
Zambia (the 1925 list), and Sudan (for 1947) taken from Kirk-Greene 
(‘Imperial administrators’, tab. 7.3, p.233), which were deflated to 1913 
prices using Officer, ‘Purchasing power’. The figure for Nigeria is the 
average of the salaries of the North and South Governors just prior to 
amalgamation. Gann and Duignan, ‘British Africa’, tab. 13, p.159, give the 
salaries for the different classes of Belgian and French governors in 1913. 
These were assigned to each colony depending on the class of governor 
listed in Exposition coloniale internationale de 1931 (for French colonies) 
and Annuaire officiel pour 1940-1 (for Belgian). Data is not available for 
Zimbabwe. Gann and Duignan do not report the salary of a 2nd class 
French governor, so this is estimated as the average of the 1st and 3rd 
class salaries. This is a similar methodology to that used by Jones, 
‘History matters’. Salaries include any personal or duty allowances. 
Growth up to 1992 
The average annual growth in per capita GDP from 1960 (or 
independence if earlier) to 1992. Source: Englebert, ‘Pre-Colonial 
Institutions’. Data not available for Namibia. 
Growth up to 1973 
The average annual growth in per capita GDP from 1960 to 1973, the 
date of the first oil shock. Source: Easterly et al., ‘Good policy’. Data not 
available for Namibia. 
Low Opportunities 
A country is classified as having low opportunities for growth if it is 
landlocked and resource scarce, as defined by Ndulu et al, Political 
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 economy. See app. I, tab. A1 for each country’s classification. Note that 
DRC and Sudan are classified as landlocked. 
Openness 
The value of trade/ GDP in 1960. Sources: Heston and Summers, Penn 
world tables, for Cameroon, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe, World Bank, World development indicators, for remaining. 
Data not available for Namibia or Sierra Leone. 
Police 
Number of European police and military / African population. Source: 
Hailey, African survey. Available for British colonies (excluding Sudan, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia) only. 
Political Centralisation 
In the main analysis, this is defined as the proportion of the population (in 
the 1960s) adjudged to belong to a ‘centralised’ ethnic group. Source: 
Gennaioli and Rainer, ‘Modern impact’. The index is based on 
anthropological data from Murdock, ‘Ethnographic atlas’. In the original 
material, the number of jurisdictional levels above the local community 
(up to a maximum of four) is estimated for each ethnic group. This 
“provides a measure of the degree of political complexity, ranging from 0 
for stateless societies to 3 or 4 for those organized in large states.”193 
Rainer and Gennaioli compress this classification into ‘fragmented’ 
(scores of 0 or 1) and ‘centralised’ (2 and above), then use data on the 
size of each ethnic group in each country (from the Atlas Norodov Mirna) 
to calculate the share of each country’s non-European population 
belonging to ‘centralised’ groups. For more information see Gennaioli and 
Rainer, ‘Modern impact’, app. 3. As a robustness check, app. VIII uses an 
alternative measure: “mean hierarchy above the family”, source: 
Englebert, ‘Pre-colonial institutions’. The source material is the same but 
the original data is not compressed into a binary measure and the value 
                                                 
193 Murdock, ‘Ethnographic Atlas’, p. 269. 
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 for each country is calculated simply as the mean value of all the ethnic 
groups present (not weighted by their population shares). 
Population Density 
Log (African population/land area) in the 1930s. Population statistics are 
from the same sources as ‘European population’. Land area is from World 
Bank, World development indicators. 
Present-Day Income 
Log of GDP per capita in 2000. Source: Maddison, Historical statistics. 
Private Investment 
Average value of private investment as a percentage of GDP for the 
years 1970 – 1994. Source: World Bank, Global development network 
growth database. Data not available for Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Guinea, Mali, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Swaziland or Tanzania. 
Public Investment 
Average value of public investment as a percentage of GDP for the years 
1970 – 1994. Source: World Bank, Global development network growth 
database. Data not available for Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, 
Mali, Namibia, Sierra Leone or Swaziland. 
Region 
Each country is classified as either west, east, equatorial or south. The 
classifications are the same as Nunn’s, ‘Long-term effects’, although his 
‘central’ is re-termed equatorial. See app. I, tab. A1 for the classification 
of each country. 
Revenue 
Total colonial revenue/African population in the 1930s. Sources: Frankel, 
Capital investment, and for FEA, Annuire statistique de l’Afrique 
Equatoriale Francaise (1936). The federations of FWA and FEA had 
general and local budgets. The general budget revenue is divided up 
among each individual territory according to its share of the total local 
budget revenue. In addition, FWA had a supplementary railway budget. 
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 Railway revenue is divided between each territory according to its share 
of total kilometres of track in the federation (obtained from Hailey, African 
survey). Revenue for non British colonies was converted into pounds 
using Officer, ‘Exchange rates’. All data for revenue is from 1935. Data for 
Madagascar was not available. The population data was obtained from 
the same sources as ‘European population’. 
Slave Exports 
Log of number of slaves exported between 1400 and 1900 (as estimated 
by Nunn) / land area. Source Nunn, ‘Long-term effects’. 
Wage Earners 
The number of wage owners/ the population aged 15-59, circa 1957. 
Source: Morrison et al., Black Africa, tab. 3.13. Data not available for 
Namibia. Unfortunately this data is far from reliable – it is likely that most 
figures are underestimates – and it is not clear whether the comparison is 
like for like as “there is considerable variation in the definition of wage 
earners.”194 It should also be borne in mind that not all wage earners 
were employed by Europeans. The extent that this variable captures
colonial government’s efforts to ‘force’ Africans into the labour market is 
therefore unclear. 
 the 
                                                
White Line 
The number of white administrators per 100,000 Africans in the late 
1930s. For sources see text and app. II. Population statistics are from the 
same sources as ‘European population’. 
Urbanisation 
Proportion of the population residing in urban areas in 1960. Source: 
World Bank, World development indicators. 
 
 
 
 
194 Morrrison et al., Black Africa, p.78. 
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 APPENDIX II: Constructing the White Line 
 
Unfortunately, disaggregated data for FWA and FEA was not available for 
the desired time period. According to the Annuaire du Ministere des 
Colonies (1936), there were 483 administrators in FWA and 213 in FEA. 
In 1921, according to the Annuaire du Gouvernement Général de l’AOF, 
there were a total of 386 administrators divided as follows: 73 in Senegal, 
71 in Guinea, 62 in Côte d'Ivoire, 44 in Dahomey, 88 in French Sudan, 31 
in Upper Volta, 12 in Mauritania and 5 in Niger. It was assumed that this 
distribution remained constant over the following 15 years; the white line 
for each territory was calculated as its share of administrators in 1921 
multiplied by the total number of administrators in 1936 (483). The 
Annuaire du Gouvernement Generale de L’AEF for 1913 revealed that in 
this year there were a total of 109 administrators in FEA; 41 in Gabon, 39 
in Congo, 15 in Oubangui-Chari and 14 in Chad. In 1951, Chefs de 
district were distributed as follows, 24 in Gabon, 31 in Congo, 33 in 
Oubangui-Chari and 33 in Chad (Annuaire de la fédération des territoires 
de l’Afrique Equatoriale Francaise). The average of these two shares was 
then used to estimate how the 213 administrators in 1936 were 
distributed among the four separate territories. 
 
The country that is now Cameroon was initially a German colony which 
was divided between French and British mandates after the First World 
War (with the majority of the country under French rule). Hailey, African 
survey, states that the total number of administrators in Nigeria and 
British Cameroon (in 1937) was 386. The Nigerian Blue book for 1937 
lists only 353 administrators, implying a total of 33 administrators in 
British Cameroon. This is then added to the 80 administrators listed in the 
French Annuaire du Ministere des Colonies for 1936, to obtain a total of 
113 administrators serving in what is now Cameroon. Kuczynski lists the 
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 populations of French and British Cameroon separately, which are simply 
added. A similar (although more straightforward) process was followed for 
Tanzania, which was as administrated as two separate colonies 
(Tanganyika and Zanzibar) by the British. 
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 APPENDIX III: Colony Classification, Number of Administrators and 
Population  
 
Table A1. 
Country Code Coloniser (at independence) Region Opportunities 
Number of 
administrators
African 
population 
Benin/ 
Dahomey BEN France West Coastal 65 978,725 
Botswana/ 
Bechuanaland BWA Britain South Landlocked 20 263,857 
Burkina Faso/ 
Upper Volta BFA France West 
Landlocked and 
resource scarce 39 3,239,722 
Burundi  BDI Belgium East Landlocked and resource scarce 26 1,708,536 
Cameroon CMR France Equatorial Coastal 113 3,017,679 
Central African 
Republic/ 
Oubangui-Chari  
CAF France Equatorial Landlocked and resource scarce 44 1,250,169 
Chad TCD France Equatorial Landlocked and resource scarce 43 1,143,100 
Congo/ Moyen 
Congo COG France Equatorial Coastal 66 385,648 
Côte d'Ivoire CIV France West Coastal 78 1,722,931 
Gabon  GAB France Equatorial Coastal 61 649,400 
Gambia  GMB Britain West Coastal 11 197,594 
Ghana/ Gold 
Coast GHA Britain West Coastal 91 3,568,961 
Guinea  GIN France West Coastal 89 2,093,726 
Kenya  KEN Britain East Coastal 164 3,066,354 
Lesotho/ 
Basutoland LSO Britain South 
Landlocked and 
resource scarce 32 560,977 
Madagascar  MDG France East Coastal 162 3,799,033 
Malawi/ 
Nyasaland MWI Britain South 
Landlocked and 
resource scarce 51 1,601,476 
Mali/ French 
Sudan MLI France West 
Landlocked and 
resource scarce 110 2,633,163 
Mauritania  MRT France West Coastal 15 288,905 
Namibia/ South 
West Africa  NAM Britain South Coastal 8 328,467 
Niger  NER France West Landlocked and resource scarce 6 1,218,457 
Nigeria  NGA Britain West Coastal 353 19,919,006
Rwanda  RWA Belgium East Landlocked and resource scarce 25 1,677,712 
Senegal  SEN France West Coastal 91 1,350,583 
Sierra Leone  SLE Britain West Coastal 40 1,889,282 
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 Sudan  SDN Britain East Landlocked and 
resource scarce 
95 5,761,042 
Swaziland  SWZ Britain South Landlocked and resource scarce 15 143,280 
Tanzania TZA Britain East Coastal 205 5,137,780 
Togo  TGO Britain West Coastal 21 763,002 
Uganda  UGA Britain East Landlocked and resource scarce 83 3,659,105 
DRC/ Belgian 
Congo ZAR Belgium Equatorial
Landlocked and 
resource scarce 728 10,981,320
Zambia / 
Northern 
Rhodesia 
ZMB Britain South Landlocked 109 1,368,087 
Zimbabwe/ 
Southern 
Rhodesia 
ZWE Britain South Landlocked and resource scarce 47 1,233,581 
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 APPENDIX IV: Raw Data for Fig. 3 
 
Table A2.  
Year Revenue (£000) 
Exports 
(£000) 
Number of 
administrators
Total 
Europeans 
employed 
European 
military 
personnel 
African 
population 
1912   278  296 17,470,630
1913 3,327 6,779      
1914    1641    
1919   239 1717 240   
1920   265     
1921   288 1907 277 18,365,634
1924 6,944 14,384 336 1934 219   
1925   333     
1927   393 2427 233 18,765,960
1928 5,895 16,927      
1929 6,045 17,581 435 2741 233 19,308,688
1930 5,622 14,778 431     
1931 4,858 8,552      
1932 4,985 9,267      
1933 4,887 8,460 392 2366 215   
1934 4,961 8,500      
1935 5,996 11,197 363     
1937    2048 193   
1938   372   20,261,796
1940     413       
 
Sources: Revenue and exports taken from Frankel, Capital investment. The number of 
administrators, total Europeans employed, Europeans military and African population 
for 1921, 1924, 1927, and 1929 is taken from the corresponding Nigerian Handbooks. 
The number of administrators for 1925, 1930, 1935, and 1940 is taken from Kirk-
Greene, ‘The thin white line’, all other data is from the relevant Blue books. Note that in 
fig. 3 the data for revenue and value of exports was converted into 1913 pounds using 
Officer, ‘Purchasing power’, and all six series were scaled so that the value of their 
earliest entry was equal to 100. 
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 APPENDIX V: Other Possible Determinants of the White Line 
 
Table. A5 examines other possible determinants of the white line which could 
have affected growth in the post-colonial period, and thus bias the estimated 
effect for the effect of the white line on growth. None of the variables 
considered were found to have a statistically significant relationship with the 
white line (even foreign investment, due to the small sample size). 
 
Table A3. 
Variable 
Number of 
observations
Correlation 
with white 
line 
T-statistic when 
included in col. 6 of 
tab. 4 
Initial income 32 0.51 0.76 
Primary school 
enrolment, 1950 24 0.20 0.80 
Secondary school 
enrolment, 1950 24 0.04 1.12 
Literacy rate, 1955 31 0.09 -0.10 
Foreign investment 
up to 1936 13 -0.11 -2.34 
Urbanisation in 
1960 33 0.42 1.09 
Christians, 1960 31 0.39 1.30 
Ethnic diversity 31 0.06 -0.18 
Landlocked 33 -0.17 -0.81 
 
For sources and description of each variable see app. I. 
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 APPENDIX VI: Correlation Matrix 
 
Table A4. 
(N = 29) 
The 
white 
line Revenue 
Wage 
Earners
European 
population
Governor's 
Salary Drain 
Political 
centralisation
Ethnic 
diversity
The white line 1        
Revenue 0.626 1       
Wage Earners 0.612 0.253 1      
European 
population 0.675 0.483 0.478 1     
Governor's 
Salary -0.291 -0.147 0.234 -0.173 1    
Drain 0.120 0.064 0.180 -0.084 -0.022 1   
Political 
centralisation -0.024 -0.143 0.027 0.248 0.077 
-
0.242 1  
Ethnic diversity 0.051 0.169 0.096 -0.348 0.137 0.324 -0.610 1 
Growth to 1992 0.371 0.047 0.246 0.551 0.058 
-
0.463 0.248 -0.221 
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APPENDIX VII: The Estimated Marginal Effect of the White Line on 
Growth 
 
 
Col. 5 of tab. 6 reports the estimation results of the following equation: 
 
Growthi = β1 + β2 (white linei) + β3 (white linei*political centralisationi) + β4Xi + Єi   (1) 
 
Where Xi are control variables and Єi is a random error term. The 
marginal effect of the white line on growth is obtained by differentiating 
equation (1) with respect to the white line: 
 
∂growth 
i 
∂white 
line i 
= Β2 + 
β3 political 
centralisationi 
 
The estimated values of β2 and β3 are 0.134 and -0.177 respectively. That 
the estimate for β3 is negative implies that the marginal benefit of closer 
administration is greater when political centralisation is lower. Fig. A1 
shows how the estimated marginal effect of the white line on growth 
varies across the sample with the degree of pre-colonial state 
development. Upper and lower bounds for the 95% confidence interval 
are also included. Note that this interval is completely above zero for the 
majority of the sample and never completely below zero, even though the 
point estimate is negative for some countries. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX VIII: Alternative Measures of Pre-Colonial Political Centralisation 
 
Tab. A5 lists Gennaioli and Rainer’s measure of pre-colonial political 
centralisation and Englebert’s measure of average hierarchy above the family. 
Gennaioli and Rainer’s measure has the advantage of being weighted by the 
population share of each ethnic group, while Englebert does not compress the 
source data (see app. I). The final column – simply the product of the two 
indices – is intended to make use of both these features. 
 
Table A5. 
 
Political 
centralisation 
Hierarchy 
above 
family 
Product 
BENIN 0.695 2.67 1.856 
BOTSWANA 0.893 2 1.786 
BURKINA FASO 0.338 1.25 0.423 
BURUNDI 0.995 3 2.985 
CAMEROON 0.316 1.5 0.474 
CAR 0.144 1.33 0.192 
CHAD 0.384 2 0.768 
CONGO 0.536 1.4 0.750 
COTE D'IVOIRE 0.082 1.71 0.140 
GABON 0.011 1 0.011 
GAMBIA 0.426 1.6 0.682 
GHANA 0.651 2 1.302 
GUINEA 0.406 2 0.812 
KENYA 0.172 1.83 0.315 
LESOTHO 1 3 3.000 
MADAGASCAR 0.505 2 1.010 
MALAWI 0.861 1.8 1.550 
MALI 0.115 2 0.230 
MAURITANIA 0.858 1.67 1.433 
NAMIBIA 0.664 . . 
NIGER 0.582 2.2 1.280 
NIGERIA 0.478 2.25 1.076 
RWANDA 0.982 3 2.946 
SENEGAL 0.694 1.67 1.159 
SIERRA LEONE 0.008 2.25 0.018 
SUDAN 0.576 2 1.152 
SWAZILAND 1 3 3.000 
TANZANIA 0.669 1.67 1.117 
TOGO 0.622 1.33 0.827 
 
 
 UGANDA 0.634 1.83 1.160 
DRC 0.649 1.71 1.110 
ZAMBIA 0.743 2 1.486 
ZIMBABWE 0.965 . . 
 
 
Tab. A6 shows that the significance of the interaction term is robust to these 
alternative measures of pre-colonial political centralisation. Col. 1 repeats the 
results of col. 5 of tab. 6, col. 2 uses Englebert’s measure and col. 3 the 
product. The slope on the interaction term is significantly below zero in all 
three cases. That the coefficient on the white line is not individually significant 
(in col. 2 and 3) means that no effect on growth can be statistically identified at 
the mean level of political centralisation. Interestingly, this increases the 
likelihood of indirect rule having only small negative effects, or even a positive 
legacy, in the most state-like societies. That said, if the interaction term is not 
included the coefficient on the white line is positive and highly significant in all 
three cases. 
 
Table A6. 
Dependent variable is the average per capita GDP growth from 1960 (or 
independence if earlier) to 1992 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Initial income -1.514* -1.417* -1.354* 
 (0.742) (0.714) (0.700) 
Limited opportunities -1.555*** -1.505*** -1.533*** 
 (0.478) (0.466) (0.470) 
Ethnic diversity 0.095 -0.201 0.516 
 (1.089) (1.068) (1.513) 
Drain -20.197*** -19.107*** -20.614*** 
 (5.620) (5.689) (5.855) 
European population               0.206 0.260 0.268 
 (0.191) (0.174) (0.198) 
Revenue -0.781* -0.822 -0.869 
 (0.424) (0.507) (0.507) 
Wage earners 0.028* 0.045* 0.038 
   (0.015) (0.025) (0.033) 
Political centralisation -0.180 -0.382 -0.073 
 (0.630) (0.412) (0.325) 
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 The white line 0.134*** 0.027 0.076 
 (0.036) (0.064) (0.061) 
The white line * political  -0.177** -0.121** -0.173** 
  Centralisation (0.066) (0.053) (0.084) 
Political centralisation as 
measured by 
Gennaioli 
and Rainer Englebert Product 
N 30 29 29 
R2 0.80 0.79 0.79 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level denoted by 
*,** and *** respectively. Constant terms were included but not reported. When the white line 
and political centralisation are interacted, the white line is centred around zero and political 
centralisation is standardised to have mean zero and standard deviation one. 
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